Education and
the concern for community

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1 - Introduction

Solidarity is not an explicit concept in the pedagogical theory. The closest we can get to ‘solidarity’ is by examining different pedagogical strands that have given a particular meaning to the involvement in the community. The idea of ‘something in common’ has underpinned very different practices of education and has led to a constant thinking and rethinking of this ‘commonality’. This thinking about ‘the common’ in different ways also has consequences, not only for the definition and role of education (professionals) but also for the place where this education is taken place (the classroom, the neighborhood, the public domain... ) and the subsequent actions that continuously form and reform this place.

The different parts of the paper put forward how different forms of thinking about community lead to different forms of educative practices. We analyze how these different forms of thinking and practice are continuously being put into question and how new concepts of community and education develop as a result of this. Hence, the paper can be seen as an attempt to provide a framework in which to position very different educational practices in relation to their view on community.

In the first part we elaborate on the concept of the rational community and its concern for ‘a common human essence’, for which education as a modern practice is an essential ‘tool’. In the second part we elaborate on social and community education and its concern for educating individuals to become responsible members of society. The first two parts of the paper evoke important questions, most notably as to the role of ‘the political’ in education: how to deal with conflict (as opposed to consensus) and diversity (as opposed to sameness)? That is why we, at the end of the second part, devote some time and space to John Dewey as an important figure in leading the way to a more political understanding of education and community. In the third and last part of the paper we further elaborate on the concept of the political community drawing on a diversity of thinkers, philosophers and researchers who in their work try to stress the importance of difference and conflict and who also develop another perspective on the public role of education and the professional.
Education as a concern for the rational community

‘Education is a central modern practice, developing alongside and as part of the modern Western, liberal, capitalist nation state. Modernist education provides training in certain forms of rationality, sensibilities, values, and subjectivities. The extension of education and educational opportunities is a symbol of progress in a modern nation state and contributes to progress through the education provided’ (Usher & Edwards, 2000, p.281)

The hopes that are associated with educational practices and the demands that are put on educators are high and manifold. In previous centuries education was supposed to civilise the masses, to contribute to progress, to distribute knowledge about science and technology, to teach future citizens about democracy, to train them for the labour market, etc. New challenges came into the picture by the beginning of the twentieth century. The educational system began to address issues such as environmental degradation, underdevelopment of the Third World, migration and its consequences, the impact of new technologies, etc. A constant factor in many of the hidden and manifest expectations related to education and educators is the emancipatory idea that education and learning are basic conditions for individual and societal development and progress. As Biesta argues, ‘education, be it the education of children, the education of adults, or the education of other “newcomers”, is after all always an intervention into someone’s life – an intervention motivated by the idea that it will make this life somehow better: more complete, more rounded, more perfect – and maybe even more human’ (Biesta, 2006, p.2). With Kant the idea of a rational and self-directed individual became the marker of this destination of mankind and educational theory and practices became dominated ‘by considerations of time, by historically oriented theories, by temporal metaphors, by notions of change and progress exemplified, for instance, in ‘stages of development’, whether conceived in terms of individual psychology ... or of modernization theory’ (Peters, 1996, p. 93). Kant describes the Enlightenment as “man’s release from his self-incurred tutelage through the exercise of his own understanding” (Kant, 1992, p.90). In this line, he focuses on the subject as an ego cogito, a knowing subject. Kant puts education at the very center of the Enlightenment because education has the task and responsibility of releasing the rationality of human beings in order to make them autonomous. The “propensity to free thinking” could only be brought about through
education (see Kant, 1982, p.710) and the human being can only become human – that is, a being who makes use of his understanding without the direction from another (which we may refer to as a rational autonomous being) – “through education” (see Kant, 1982, p.699).

The educator is then some kind of a midwife whose task it is to release the rational potential of the human being on who the light of truth and prosperity can come to shine (Säfström, 2011). It is a concept of education that posits a norm of ‘humaneness,’ a norm of what it means to be human, and in doing so excludes those who do not live up to or are unable to live up to this norm (Biesta, 2006).

What comes to the fore is an educational system that has set itself up as a major agent in the development of a rational community of modern society. Looking at the history of education, Depaepe (2012, p. 11) concludes ‘that education and teaching proved not to be aimed primarily at equality of opportunity or emancipation of the masses, but rather at social control, disciplining and standardization of behavior. Just as pupils had to learn to write between the lines of their exercise books at school, so this institution had taken on the task of seeing to it that its students conducted themselves within the bounds of what was morally desirable and socially acceptable’. According to Bauman (1995, in Biesta 2006) this modern concept of education is constituted on a common language and a common human essence and built on something in common: a nation, a polis, an institution. Drawing on Lingis (1994), we can describe this particular way of knowing and acting as taking part in a ‘rational community.’ Within a rational community, the established principles and practices proper to a particular community are regarded as the ultimate standard. In the rational community “the insights of individuals are formulated in universal categories, such that they are detached from the here-now index of the one who first formulated them” (Lingis, 1994, p.110).

Membership of the rational community gives people a voice. It enables them to speak, but it is speech in the capacity of their membership of the rational community. This means that the voice by which they speak is a representative voice. Membership of the rational community thus enables people to speak as “rational agents”, that is as representatives “of the common discourse” (Lingis, 1994, p.110). Through qualification and socialization schools and other educational institutions provide their students with this representative voice through a particular curriculum.

2.1. Citizenship education as an inclusion into the rational community

The constitution of a rational community has cast a long shadow over citizenship education. Citizenship education is connected with particular expectations regarding citizens’ duty to lead a ‘civilized life’ and the ability of citizens to contribute in a deliberative way to the expression of the
general interest (Trienekens, 2004). In this view, acquiring particular knowledge and skills is a prerequisite for the participation as citizens in democracy. Lawy and Biesta (2006) call this perspective ‘citizenship-as-achievement’ or ‘citizenship-as-outcome’ as it is founded upon the assumption that citizenship is an outcome of a particular educational trajectory. Citizenship is a status that individuals can achieve only if one moves through a particular educational trajectory. This status of citizenship ‘is associated implacably with reason, rationality, objectivity, argument, work, text, information and knowledge’ (Dahlgren, 2006, p.275). This focus on the individuals’ ability to become a self-directed agent is further heightened by what Zygmunt Bauman has called the ‘liquid modernity’ of the current society (2007). The ‘liquid modernity’ is a state of society “in which all social forms melt faster than new ones can be cast” (2005, p.303). Social relations, attachment, life-projects change relentlessly and permanently in this liquid state of modernity. Long-term projects, collective social action and communitarian foundations of any kind are undermined, become loosened, and dissolve. In this liquid modernity education is primarily associated with individuals’ ability to function in an increasingly complex, diverse and ambiguous society, which demands more and more from its citizens in terms of particular sets of knowledge, attitudes and skills that enable them to participate in a society in which citizenship is a matter of fluid, dynamic and negotiated identities. At the same time, it seems that inclusion of all citizens is a major concern, in the sense that everyone should be able to function autonomously, creatively, in collaboration with others, as the ‘architect of one’s own life’ (Beck, 1986).

In this context, the practice of citizenship becomes more like a method of social inclusion and educators prepare individuals willing to contribute creatively to the development of society and to their personal growth. The fact that the same society also excludes people, unevenly distributes opportunities for participation, depletes natural resources, causes suffering by irresponsible financial speculation, pushes people off the boat, etc. is not a concern. As argued by Kunneman (1996), professionals lose sight of the fact that many issues related to their professional activities also have a strong political dimension. Kunneman (1996) calls this dimension ‘normative professionalism’ and describes it as ‘a reflexive attitude towards one’s own professional activities, more particularly a reflexive attitude towards the interference of strategic fields of power ... within one’s own professional activities’ (Kunneman, 1996, p.243). A lack of ‘normative professionalism’ implies that professionals do not reflect on how their own professional activities are situated within what Mouffe (2005) calls the hegemonic power field. Citizenship practices have a political dimension because, apart from a social integration dimension, they also reflect certain power relations. The way in which we structure our education system, organize traffic, plan public space, shape our cities, activate the unemployed or combat poverty is determined by hegemonic interventions.
Education in view of active citizenship equals taking control of one’s own life with a view to active participation in society. The contrasts, tensions, dilemmas and conflicts inherent in this society remain unproblematic. Educators has the task then to take all into the orderly, rational realm of society, ‘so that subjects come fully autonomous and capable of exercising their individual and intentional agency’ (Usher & Edwards, 1994, p.24-25). And as Rancière (1987) indicates they have contributed to the paradox of emancipation by transforming themselves into explained explainers, mixing equality and its contrary. In their effort to explain how to make an equal society of unequal men they not only install a norm of what it means to be a human being/citizen but also tend to narrow down citizenship education to its methodological aspects, to a quest for the most effective and efficient way to teach diverse groups of people. This leads to a tamed version of democracy and to the constitution of a rational community in which conflicts are neutralized. (Simons & Masschelein, 2010a, p.596)

2 - A concern for social education

“Is social pedagogy essentially the embodiment of dominant societal interests which regard all educational projects, schools, kindergarten or adult education, as a way of taking its values to all sections of the population and of exercising more effective social control; or is social pedagogy the critical conscience of pedagogy, the thorn in the flesh of official agenda, an emancipatory program for self-directed learning processes inside and outside the education system geared towards the transformation of society?” (Lorenz 1994: 93)

The individual as a rational, knowing and self-directed subject and education as the responsibility of releasing this rationality in order to make individuals autonomous (cfr supra), was questioned by a pedagogical strand called ‘social pedagogy’. Social pedagogy puts the concern for the community in the center of educative practices. Hence one of the first definitions by Edelheim (in line with Natorp):

“Sozialpädagogik hat die Erziehung der Individuen für die Gesellschaft, d.h. ihre politische und soziale Erziehung zum Zweck” (Edelheim 1902, quoted in Coumou, 1998, p.3)
Social pedagogy is sometimes translated as 'community education' or 'education for sociality' (Smith, 2009). It has its roots in the development of a progressive education in Germany. The term is believed to have been introduced by Karl Mager in 1844. It was seen largely as an alternative to mainstream education which did not sufficiently take account of the degree to which individuals interact with the social world around them. The origins of social pedagogy can be found in a reaction to Individualpädagogik (Coumou, 1998; van Ghent, 1994). Individualpädagogik is only concerned with the education of the human being as an individual, while social pedagogy is concerned with the education of the human being as a member of the community. The start of social pedagogy is founded on the idea that the community has a rightful claim on the individual. Social pedagogy stress the importance of educating the individual as a responsible member of society and the importance of common ideals to structure the society. This focus on the importance on common ideals, was further strengthen by the fear of a chaotic society, a decline of social cohesion and a neglect of others. Mennicke (1887-1959, Netherlands) shows how socio pedagogical thinking also developed at the background of the growing individualization due to the industrialization and urbanization of society. Socio pedagogical thinking is linked to the emergence of a “socio pedagogical problem”, that is the question how to fit individuals in the society (Coumou, 1998). In the Middle Ages, there was no socio pedagogical problem since everybody’s position and status was fixed and prescribed. By living within a specific position and related social group, men became educated. Also the omnipresent influence of religion made that people were constituted by the community they live in. The pedagogical situation changed dramatically when people did not have a fixed orientation anymore and hence, a concern for social education arose.

2.1. The founding ideas of social pedagogy

In the socio-philosophical thinking of Paul Natorp (1854-1927), the so-called ‘father of social pedagogy’, we find the basis for regarding pedagogy as a theory around community (Eriksson, 2010). Natorp’s work should be interpreted within the context of Germany at the end of the 19th, beginning of the 20th century (Smith, 2009). He sees Germany at that time as an atomized society, in need of a strong sense of community and a fight to close the gap between rich and poor. Natorp regarded social pedagogy as a theory on fostering community (Eriksson, 2010). For Natorp, the singular individual does not exist, it is an Einzelzelle in the large organism of humanity (Coumou, 1998). Natorp believes that individuals become social human beings by being socialized into the human collective (Stephens, 2009). The individual and the community are each other prerequisites (Eriksson, 2010) and we can only be human by being a member of humanity (Coumou, 1998). Education then, is
about the individual that learns to know and comply with the general rules and standards of social life. Education is not restricted to the development of the individual intellectual education but is situated in the interaction with other human beings (Zernike, 1905 quoted in Coumou, 1998, p.22). Education was to take place in three environments: from the educating community of the household, through the national and uniform school, into the free self-education of adults of all social backgrounds (Marburger, 1979 quoted in van Ghent, 1994, p.97). Natorp criticizes the French approach which left the task of social education to national legislation and structures set up by the state and instead emphasizes that the concept of *Volksgemeinschaft* requires a movement against dehumanizing tendencies in industrialization and urbanization (Lorenz, 2012). This movement should reclaim solidarity structures at the level of civil society and aim to strengthen the moral fabric of modern societies. A key example of this kind of practice is the youth movement.

In the Netherlands, Jacob Kohlbrugge (1865 – 1941) developed a socio pedagogical line of thought with his book ‘Practical Sociology’ (Coumou, 1998). In this work he elaborates on the concept of ‘social education’: from an early age children should be made aware of social responsibilities. That is why the family, the school and youth organisations should be places for exercising community life where youngsters are educated to collaborate for a common purpose. Social education was not only aimed at children and youngsters; everybody needs to be stimulated to serve the community and become conscious about the fact that what one does or does not do, has consequences for the social fabric of society (Kohlbrugge, 1925 quoted in Coumou, 1998, p.122). The individual only has value because of his ability to serve others and hence to perform social work with the aim to improve social conditions. For social pedagogists the value of an individual is to be found in the contribution to the community (Zernike, 1905 quoted in Coumou, 1998, p.35). Community is not an external force that coerces previously isolated individuals but individuals are in some way always and from the very beginning constituted by the community (G. Biesta, 2006). Social pedagogy tries to strengthen this constitution by the community and education is thus always educating for the community (Coumou, 1998).

2.2. *Community as a radical force for change*

Not only social pedagogy theory but also all kind of practices of community development give rise to an important question about who or what should be changed (Eriksson, 2010).
“Is it a question of the individual or the group changing their way of thinking and acting in order to become an integrated part of society or is it a question of the societal communities broadening their boundaries so that everybody can be included? Or must the whole social structure be changed to enable marginalized groups to live an active life and also influence the group’s situation?” (Eriksson, 2010, p.416-417)

A very important remark on social pedagogy was made by Lorenz who argues that the notion of community as the precondition for a truly human form of existence is not community in an already existing or predefined form but community as a project yet to be realized. According to Eriksson (2010) social pedagogical ambitions concern both adaptation to and mobilization for social change. Social pedagogy is about adapting to and fostering community but also has a mobilizing, radical dimension with the aim to liberate citizens from oppression, marginalization. The methods used in this radical dimension are more directed towards changes in the local society or society as a whole. In the conservative dimension, the community is seen as something threatened which must be restored or reconstructed (Eriksson, 2010). An underlying idea is that consensus is possible and desirable and that the community in itself contains something good and desirable. From the 1960s practices of community development developed a more radical perspective. There is the ambition to create a better society that can take a clearer stand on human rights and equalities. Paolo Freire (1972) is an important representative of this radical ambition. Freire (1972: 77) introduces what he terms the investigation of the people’s view on the world – the complex of their ‘generative themes’ – as a practice of freedom. He points out that we must pose their ‘existential, concrete, present situation to the people as an issue which challenges them and requires a response – not just at the individual level, but at the level of action.’ (Freire 1972: 76). For Freire the aim of education is to enable people to make sense of the world, not as a ‘given’ world but as a world dynamically ‘in the making’. Community education can be understood as cultural action that arises when evident realities and truths are unveiled, essentially questioned and challenged. Freire has inspired many community workers with an approach of education that is concerned with exposing and transforming structures and relations of power which systematically marginalize and exclude people and their perspectives and actions in the public sphere (Shaw 2007). At a later stage, post-modern and post-structuralist critiques have challenged these modernist, emancipatory concepts. Especially some feminist critics deconstructed some of the ‘repressive myths’ of the emancipatory discourse (Ellsworth, 1989). Yet, an important insight of that tradition is the importance of radically democratizing educational practices, opening up opportunities for structural change.
2.3. John Dewey and a concern for a democratic community

John Dewey (1859 – 1952) is not part of the continental tradition of social pedagogy. Recent readings of his work show his concern for involving people in a common life but also a concern for a democratic education that can enhance a larger political discussion about what kind of community should be in the making (Hewitt, 2006). In this way Dewey is an important figure in leading the way to a more political understanding of education and community (cfr. infra). According to Dewey, the older idea of democracy that assumed that individuals were ‘competent to frame policies, to judge their results, competent to know in all situations demanding political action what is for his own good and competent to enforce his idea of good and the will to effect it against contrary forces’ (Dewey, 1927 quoted in Flamm, 2006, p.46) turned out to be an illusion. But Dewey held optimism in the abilities of the public to fulfill democratic aims through community life itself (Flamm, 2006).

‘Regarded as an idea, democracy is not an alternative to other principles of associated life. It is the idea of community life itself’ (Flamm, 2006, p.47)

For Dewey community is a practical task which requires commitment and has to be carried on day by day (Bernstein, 1987) Democracy is more than a form of government, it is a mode of associated living (Hansen, 2009). Following Dewey’s line of thought, Hansen (2009) states that democracy happens when people exchange thoughts in a meaningful way around a meal, when they share views in the shop or at the public park, when they comment on common concerns on e-mail or over the phone, and in countless other venues. Thus, democracy comes to life in everyday association between people rather than awaiting the establishment of formal institutions. Democracy takes place in everyday practices because there is according to Dewey a certain ‘interest’ and engagement with the wider world. A person engages the world, learns from it and in it and judges accordingly. This interest does not await top-down initiatives to spring to life, it has an organic source at the crossroads of individual and community interaction. Dewey defines community as a practice ‘wherever there is conjoint activity whose consequences are appreciated as good by all singular persons’ (Flamm, 2006, p.47). The challenge of community then, is to identify adequate conditions for the possibility of flourishing associative activity (Flamm, 2006).

in Dewey’s understanding of community ‘everyday practices’ and ‘contact with others’ are crucial. According to Dewey, the voice and the perspective of “the other” is always an essential source for our understanding of the world (Stengel, 2009). Individual liberty or freedom always involves the matter of a just relation with others who make up the social environment and who pose their needs,
expectations and demands (Hewitt, 2006). Dewey speaks of the creation of the Great Community as a practice through which different individual voices are heard through mutual learning and cooperation (Saito, 2009). To be with others is not simply a physical fact, but involves efforts to continuously seek for a common ground with what is other and different (Bernstein, 1987). We need to learn from who do not share our experiences and ‘make every effort to identify, or if need to be created, common interests across borders (Ryder, 2007). For Dewey ‘shared practices’ in everyday life provide human beings with the fundamental means of living and learning. In shared activities people come to identify new interests and capacities to realize individual liberty and social equality. The growth of an individual’s interests (personal liberty) takes place within a social environment consisting of others who make claims upon the individual to act in such a way that is considerate of and fair to the full development of others (social equality). Through the interaction with others, mere association can tighten into a community in which the activity of each is referred with interest to the activities of others (Hewitt, 2006) and in which there is a readiness to work collaboratively with others to advance shared interests and solve shared problems (Hytten, 2009). Thus, in Dewey’s vision, citizens are concerned with both individual growth and the cultivation of a common good. Citizens balance individual rights with social responsibilities in seeking to create enriching ways of living in harmony with others.

With Dewey we see a concern for differences and plurality but even a bigger belief in the possibility to create something in common and to live in harmony with others. Since Dewey the interest in processes of mutual learning and cooperation has grown widely and has particularly resulted into a focus on processes of social learning in all kind of participatory practices of planning. A confrontation with the points of view of other stakeholders (be it citizens, scientists, pressure groups, public services, etc.) can end in the re-thinking and adjustment of one’s own perspective and people are stimulated to resolve or actively tackle collective problems. Four basic axes of learning in terms of four tensions are central for social learning: ‘action’ (between need and competence), ‘reflection’ (between distance and belonging), ‘communication’ (between unilateral and multilateral control) and ‘negotiation’ (between consent and dissent). First, people engage in ‘action’ because they experience a need, a desire, a shortage or a challenge. In order to meet this need, a variety of competences, skills and resources are mobilized. A lack of skills strengthens powerlessness and frustration. A lack of need leads to routine action and feelings of senselessness. It is important to strike a balance between competence and need, to stimulate experiences of competence and motivation to ‘make a difference’ by actively transforming problematic situations. Second, it is vital for social learning processes to stand back from the action from time to time and to ‘reflect’ on the basic assumptions and purposes and the effectiveness of the chosen strategies. However, a limited
focus on rationality is in contrast with emotionally charged motivations of many of the participants. The emotional significance of an engagement is invaluable for articulating and explaining the underlying desires, values, expectations, and needs. Particular attention has therefore to be drawn to a right balance between rational distance and affective belonging. Third, every network of actors also ‘communicates’ with and depends on the outside world concerning both the causes of and the solutions for a posed problem. Furthermore, a social learning group is responsible for the consequences of its purposes and strategies on other people and institutions. A crucial challenge is to organize competences and responsibilities within the group (unilateral control) while accepting views and concerns of (potential) partners and stakeholders from the outside (multilateral control). Four, participation and debate contains ‘negotiation’. Differences in defining a problem tend to conceal imbalance of power. Willingness to cooperate and to learn from each other is a necessary condition to be able to handle these differences. Hence, a social learning process continuously oscillates between the articulation and explication of differences (dissent) and the search for synergy (consent).

Processes of social learning proved to be ambivalent and vulnerable processes as it became mainstream in practice. Social learning is basically a radical concept but runs the risk of a pragmatic, depoliticized application in practice. Wildemeersch and Vandenabeele (2007) have recently called for a redefinition of the relationship between social learning and democracy. Social learning needs to be relocated as a democratic practice in the context of conflictual late modern societies. Today, society is challenged by far-reaching problems that are characterised by uncertain expert knowledge. They are too complicated, controversial, and unstable for central regulation and therefore require a participatory, collective, and problem-oriented approach. Such issues emerge in diverse domains, e.g. big planning projects in cities, field experiments with biotechnology, multi party negotiations in the third world settings related to water management projects, nature conservation etc.. Scientific knowledge is often uncertain and causes and effects are complex and unclear. Uncontested ethical guidelines do not exist. Therefore, neither mainstream institutions nor existing expertise is able to tackle such problems. Within the field of Science and Technology Studies (STS) Bruno Latour and Noortje Marres have developed an interesting view on how ‘issues call publics into being’ (Marres, 2005, p. 47). A ‘public’, they argue, is required so as to adopt issues which currently existing institutions and experts are failing to address or prove incapable of finding a settlement for. Such a public, Marres emphasizes, is caught up in the issue at stake. Drawing on Dewey’s (1927) conception of the public she qualifies an issue as a public issue if the spread of the effects of a given action is far enough to substantially affect actors who are not directly involved in the action. Latour (2005, p. 27), too, argues that our globalised world is characterised by the intimate entanglement of a variety of
human and nonhuman actors that are, willingly or unwillingly, connected by the expansion of all kinds of ‘assemblages’ such as markets, technologies, science, ecological crises, wars and terrorist networks. Those many differing assemblages, he stresses, are already connecting people no matter how much they don’t feel assembled by any common lifestyle, interest, or commitment.

Marres (2005; 2007; 2010) and Latour (2005) further clarify this notion of entanglement by elaborating that our relation to public issues should be understood in terms of ‘attachment’. The concept of attachment is used by actor network theorists to refer to a special relation between human and nonhuman entities. Attachment, in this account, is a mode of ‘being affected by’ whereby actors are both actively committed to an object of passion and dependent on it (Marres, 2005). They must do a lot of work so as to sustain this object of passion while, at the same time, the object binds them in the sense that their pleasure, fate, way of life and perhaps even the meaningfulness of their world is conditioned by it. This entanglement, this state of affectedness, they argue, can take the form of institutional, physical, monetary, and legal ties as well as of attention, interest, involvement, or of being touched, implicated, and mobilised by an issue. It is this notion of attachments that allows Marres to complement or, rather, to sharpen Dewey’s account of the public. Starting from these attachments, she argues that one cannot adequately define a public by merely referring to actors that are commonly implicated in an issue. The fact that actors are all affected by the issue at stake is not a sufficient characterisation for it since actors are not only jointly but also antagonistically implicated in public issues. They have divergent attachments and the sustainability of these attachments is threatened by the attachments that exclude them. Being jointly and antagonistically implicated in an issue, then, means being bound together by mutual exclusivities between various attachments. Acknowledging this antagonism thus implies

‘to move beyond the “mere” statements of divergences among attachments that permeate social life — where one says “I am into the environment” and another “I am into the oil-based economy,” or something of the sort, after which each goes his or her own way. We enter into a situation where an object of contention [...] provides an opportunity to enact the disagreement between various, entangled, exclusive attachments, over a specific, concrete, accessible question’ (Marres, 2005, p. 129)

What Marres emphasises is that actors ‘come together in controversy because they are divided by the issue at stake’ (Marres 2005, p. 128). Obviously, such a public cannot be conceived of as a social community. On the contrary, a public comes into being precisely when no social community exists that may take care of the issue at stake. The task of the public is thus to take ‘care of the serious
trouble in which those who do not necessarily share a way of life are collectively implicated’ (Marres 2005, p. 56). A public is therefore not to be understood as a sociable collective, a convivial get-together of people that share a lifestyle or a commitment. Being jointly implicated in an affair is not necessarily based on ‘shared interests’. Rather, what binds actors is that, in order for them to take care of an issue, they must take into account the effect it has on others. It is, thus, the issue that brings actors together, not the bonds of a shared form of life. And these issues transgress the boundaries of existing social communities. Latour (2005) elaborates upon it by referring to the etymology of the old word ‘Thing’ or ‘Ding’ that originally designated a certain type of archaic assembly. Early senses of the word included ‘meeting’ and ‘matter’, ‘concern’ as well as ‘inanimate object’. Ancient Icelandic deputies, for instance, were called ‘thingmen’ and gathered in the ‘Althing’, in an isolate place where disputes were addressed. This old etymology shows, according to Latour, that we ‘don’t assemble because we agree, look alike, feel good, are socially compatible or wish to fuse together but because we are brought by divisive matters of concern into some neutral, isolated place in order to come to some sort of provisional makeshift (dis)agreement’ (Latour, 2005, p. 13).

‘[L]ong before designating an object thrown out of the political sphere and standing there objectively and independently, the Ding or Thing has for many centuries meant the issue that brings people together because it divides them. [...] If the Ding designated both those who assemble because they are concerned as well as what causes their concerns and divisions, it should become the centre of our attention.’ (Latour, 2005, p. 13, emphasis in original)

3 - A concern for the publicness of community

As elaborated above, the importance of community has inspired social pedagogical theories and practices since its beginning days. The ongoing globalization of society brings forward the question whether and how the engagement of educators with community building still makes sense today. Giorgio Agamben (1993/1990) speaks of the schizophrenia permeating the flexible individuals who are permanently seeking community. On the one hand, they wipe out all belonging to stable and firmly found communities, categories and foundations. Individuals permanently seek to overcome any fixed identity in order to re-invent themselves. On the other hand, they keep on looking for the paradise of identity and community: in advertisements, in commodities, in internet communities, in sports clubs, in leisure activities, in single issue movements. The importance given to community
today is then often related to the idea of “recovering a balance between community and individualism” (Brint, 2001, p.1). In this line of thought, individualism has gone too far and has undermined the sense of solidarity and social cohesion (Duyvendak & Hurenkamp, 2004). Against this fragmentation and its impact – loneliness, fear and alienation (Welch & Panelli, 2007) – community is proposed as a new way of creating safety and mutual concern. Community is a place where social relations can be restored and where we are no longer strangers to each other. There is a certain nostalgia in this line of thought (Rancière, 2007/1992). Our modern times of individualism seem to lose something. A particular way of being together has to be restored. Community seems something that is not available to us, something we long for. This makes it hard to be against the idea of community nowadays. Community appears as something good, according to Zygmunt Bauman (2001, p.1): Words have meanings: some words, however, also have a ‘feel’. The word ‘community’ is one of them. It feels good: whatever the word ‘community’ may mean, it is good ‘to have a community’, ‘to be in a community.’ (…) Company or society can be bad; but not the community. Community, we feel, is always a good thing.

3.1. Building a good community

There are at least two important traditions (sometimes conflated) in educational research that studies practices as means to build a good community: the social cohesion traditions and the critical tradition. The differences between these traditions result from a different definition of what a good community means. Building a social cohesive society is nowadays the dominant tradition and is yet another form of what we’ve already described as the constitution of a rational community. Within the social cohesion tradition practitioners have to realize a community that is closely integrated, that is productive, and that has no internal conflicts. Community building is seen as an investment in a particular kind of social relations, where all, no matter how different, share the same basic values and seek to agree on future projects. The kind of future revenues social cohesion promises, seem now more and more related to economic objectives and economic competitiveness (Jenson & Saint-Martin, 2003). One consequence is that investments in social cohesion, attempts to promote community through for example social and cultural organization, must pay off. What matters in the evaluation of the projects is that communities develop the skills to be responsible for their own outcomes, that people have the capacity to compete and are willing to identify with their communities (Millar & Kilpatrick, 2005). Identification with others hangs together with the willingness to develop and use capacities for the benefit of the community in a competitive world. Learning does not only bring individual benefits, but is deemed useful for the wider community, or as
Hodgson (2009, p.69) concludes: “Investment in learning not only contributes to self-actualization but at the same time delivers competencies that enable people to operate in their labour environment and in society as a whole.”

In opposition to the dominant social cohesion tradition, many practitioners work from a critical perspective on community building. Community building is, in line of the ideas of Freire, seen as an important practice of resistance and critique against oppressive structures, which are nowadays often linked to the worldwide impact of neo-liberalism and economic globalisation (Clover 2006). The concern of community building, here, is “working for social justice through empowering disadvantaged, excluded and oppressed communities to take more control over the conditions of their lives” (Butcher, Banks, Henderson, & Robertson, 2007, p.17). Community building practices develop spaces of resistance and critique in which people empower themselves and develop their own vision about a more desirable world. Practitioners stimulate people to express their view and experiences, and realize changes in their circumstances. This implies that community workers identify with oppressed groups and not with the dominant power structures. They contribute to a just society that does not silence marginal voices and enhance solidarity against oppression (Rossing & Glowacki Dudka, 2001).

Despite their different definition of the good community, the social cohesion and the critical tradition are both based on two assumptions that are increasingly challenged in theoretical debates: the assumption that practitioners can know what the good community is and the assumption that practices are an instrument to build such a community through learning. In both traditions practices of community building are seen as interventions or treatments for a malfunctioning community. In the social cohesion tradition, individuals should learn the knowledge, skills and attitudes to be a good citizen. The learning that is involved in the formation of citizens can be understood as socialisation into a well-defined position in the community. It is clear what it means to be a good citizen and individuals need to adapt to fit in. In the critical tradition, individuals need interventions form the outside to be emancipated and to overcome their oppression. Fendler (Fendler, 2006), who analysed U.S. literature on community practices, argues that also in the critical tradition ‘target groups’ are defined as lacking community and as deficient. Despite the explicit purpose of empowerment, this tradition starts from defining target groups as deficient. Fendler (2006, p.313) argues that “some groups are positioned as deficient and in need of remediation, and other groups are seen as normal and acceptable as is,” which is “an example of deficit-model thinking in which those who are excluded from the community are regarded as lacking, in need of assistance, or deserving of support from those more fortunate.” The analysis of what oppressive structures are and the interventions
and outcomes that are based on this analysis can be defined in a definite sense. This ultimately also entails socialisation or adaptation to a known ideal and rational community (Ellsworth, 1989). The use of a normative definition of the good community leads to a conception of education research as an evaluation of effectiveness (what works to build a good community?). This way of research is often appreciated by practitioners and policy makers who aim to find solutions for concrete problems in their neighbourhood or city.

Young (1986) has written an influential critique on the assumptions and implications of the ideal of community. Her critique addresses researchers from the critical tradition who appeal to community as alternative for oppression and exploitation. Young (1986, p.3) claims that the ideal of community represents an ideal of living together as a whole or unity. This always depends on a distinction of what is included, good and shared from what is excluded, not desired and separated: “Any definition or category creates an inside/outside distinction, and the logic of identity seeks to keep those borders firmly drawn.” The ideal of community denies differences, because it is assumed that we all understand each other and can belong to the same social wholeness. This is however no longer the case, as we live with the presence of so many differences (Bauman, 2001).

Another critique on the assumption that practitioners can know what the good community is comes from Esposito (Esposito, 2010). According to Esposito (2010, p.2) community is reduced to a kind of object when it is postulated as a normative ideal: “The truth is that these conceptions are united by the ignored assumption that community is ‘a property’ belonging to the subjects that join them together: an attribute, a definition, a predicate that qualifies them as belonging to the same totality, or as a ‘substance’ produced by their union.” For Esposito (2010), community is something we cannot know in advance, know as an abstract ideal of sameness. When we reduce community to a property of sameness, we actually distort what we try to name. Community is then conceived as an property that can be added to subjects. It is an added value that is treated as if it were a quality that defines the members of a community. In other words, community is defined as a ‘private’ property instead of a ‘public’ event where we are exposed to others who do not share the same properties. In a search for a pedagogy of this public event or space recent educational researchers make use of (political) philosophers and political thinkers as Arendt, Mouffe, Rancière, Esposito etc.
3.2. Education as a responsibility for the coming into presence

Todd (Todd, 2010c) points at the necessity to move from an education that cultivates the idea of humanity to an education that faces humanity and its inherent conflicts. She looks in a critical way at ‘a current turn to a cosmopolitan direction in education with its concern for world citizenship, human rights, democracy and cross-cultural understanding’ (Todd, 2010c, p.7). Cosmopolitanism positions a shared humanity as a condition of world citizenship beyond the narrow borders of national identities and schools are called upon to educate and socialize youngsters in the art of human co-existence founded on what they share with others. On the face of it, this appears to be a welcomed kind of thinking, especially given the present scope of social breakdown and violence around the globe. But, according to Todd (2010c), this idea fails to recognize that the very injustices and antagonisms which are the targets of such ‘humane education’ are created and sustained precisely through our human talent for producing them; she speaks of a ‘human gift for mutual hatred and destruction’, ‘violence as human possibility’ and an ‘inhuman element inherent in the human condition’ (Todd, 2010c, p.10). Even more, humanity has been used to justify the exclusion of those with who we are in conflict and often leaves us without a language for dealing with the antagonistic elements of human interaction, which are ubiquitous in educational and social encounters. If antagonism is seen to be harmful to democracy, we lack adequate means for facing cultural conflict in our educational endeavors and thereby undermine the very possibility for recognizing pluralism and teaching responsively in troubled times (Todd, 2010c).

Since subjects are always formed in relation to specific contexts which no two subjects can ever entirely share, specific moments and contexts where one can encounter actual, other people becomes important sites of education. During these encounters, as Todd (Todd, 2010c) argues, cultural differences appear and the troublesome aspects of human interaction and local complexity can come forward. Todd (Todd, 2010c) draws upon the work of Irigaray who claims that education in civil life is ‘an education in being rather than in having: being oneself, being with others, being in a moment of history...’ (Irigaray, 2001 quoted in Todd, 2010c, p.135). Irigaray shifts the emphasis to relationality and sees education in citizenship more in terms of a life-sustaining project as opposed to a set of knowledges to be acquired. The real challenge facing education should be on how to open up educational spaces of relationality. In this sense, there is an important difference between educating for cosmopolitanism (based on a faith in universal principles) and thinking cosmopolitan. The latter is an active engagement within a particular context of human pluralism, a context that is not purely shaped by universal principles. Some theorists have focused on the idea of translation to highlight
the ways in which our claims to universality are always products of particular cultural and linguistic contexts; their meanings cannot be imposed onto other contexts, without undergoing considerable alteration (Butler, 2000). To become meaningful, universal principles, such as freedom and equality, should be translated in and through concrete situations with others and universal claims should always be subject to refinement, redefinition and reformulation (Todd, 2010a, 2010c). Without this possibility, we risk an abstraction that seems to live a life of its own and ends up having little to do with the ongoing human interaction through which these values, commitments and universal are in fact postulated (Todd, 2010c). The quest and challenge for education is to signify what peaceful coexistence, the elimination of discrimination, abuse and violence, the promotion of justice across cultural differences... mean in the everydayness of human relationality. Situated contexts are the only ones through with we continually negotiate and translate what is given and where the possibility for transformation is kept alive (Todd, 2010a).

Todd (2010b) argues that transformation is involved in a change of being in the world, becoming present. For this, she draws on Arendt who argues that the creation of something unexpected is only possibly by virtue of our exposure to others and through our relations to others via speech and action. The present is transformative, since it contains the possibility to create something new, and relational, since this newness occurs in a context with others. For Arendt, to act means to take initiative, to begin something new. She argues that what makes each of us unique, is our potential to do something that has not been done before. We continuously bring new beginnings into the world through our words and deeds. For Arendt, action is intimately connected with freedom; the freedom to call something into being which did not exist before (Arendt, 1977 quoted in G. Biesta, 2010b, p.48). Freedom is a public and hence a political phenomenon. It needs a public space and it only exists in action, which means that human beings are free as long as they act. Further, our capacity for action – and hence our freedom – crucially depends on the ways in which others take up our beginnings. Action is, according to Arendt, never possible in isolation; ‘plurality is the condition of human action’ (Arendt, 1977 quoted in G. Biesta, 2010b, p.48). Democracy, according to Arendt, can be understood as the situation in which everyone has the opportunity to be a subject, that is, to act and, through their actions, bring their beginnings into the world of plurality and difference. Arendt’s notion of action entails an understanding of the way in which human beings come into presence that is not about the expression of some predefined understanding of the world, but has to do with the ways in which we engage with the complexities of a world populated by others who are not like us.

As Biesta (G. Biesta, 2006; G. Biesta, 2010b) indicates, Arendt articulates a concern for an education that does not try to produce or release something (as in the rational community) but an education as
a responsibility for the coming into presence of unique individual beings. The responsibility of the educator is about asking difficult questions: questions that summon us to respond responsively and responsibly to otherness and difference in our own, unique ways (G. Biesta, 2006). Educational responsibility is a double responsibility: a responsibility for ‘newcomers’ and a responsibility for the world in which these newcomers begin. The former is about challenging students to respond by confronting them with what and who is other and by posing such fundamental questions as “what do you think”, “where do you stand” and “how will you respond”. Asking these difficult questions and creating difficult encounters allows students to come into the world. The latter is a responsibility to create and keep in existence a ‘worldly space’ through which new beginnings can come into presence. These worldly spaces are spaces that provide opportunities for all to bring their beginnings into the complex web of plurality (the world) in which the encounter with otherness and difference is a real possibility. Arendt poses important questions: what kind of schools do we need so that children and students can act and what kind of society do we need so that people can act? What the Arendtian conception of the democratic person brings into view, is that we cannot simply blame education for the failure of democracy. The only way to improve the democratic quality of society is by providing more opportunities for action, initiative, response, expression... and by supporting reflection on those situations in which action was possible and on those situations in which action was not possible (G. Biesta, 2006). Although action is about invention and creation, we should not think of it as something exceptional or spectacular (G. Biesta, 2007a). Action can be very mundane. Action ranges from the words and deeds that are widely visible, to the things that are almost hidden from the view. It ranges from scientific breakthroughs and inventions to the ways in which we care for others, it ranges from the speech of a political leader to casting one’s vote or refusing to vote. Through all these words and deeds we bring something new into the world, we bring ourselves into the world.

Learning then becomes responding as opposed to acquisition (cfr. rational community). Someone has learned something not when he or she is able to copy and reproduce what already existed, but when he or she responds to what is unfamiliar and different. Learning becomes a creation or an invention, a process of bringing something new into the world. Again the role of education lies in making sure that there are opportunities to meet and encounter what is different, strange and other and that there are opportunities to let students respond to this in order to find their own voice. This leads us to the concept of ‘a community of those who have nothing in common’ (Lingis, 1994). When I speak to the stranger, when I expose myself to the stranger, when I want to speak in the community of those who have nothing in common, then I have to find my own voice (G. Biesta, 2006, p.64). In this community, we are no longer representatives of the common discourse as in the rational community.
(Lingis, 1994). According to Lingis (1994), the other community lives inside the rational community as a constant possibility and comes into presence as soon as one responds to the other, to the otherness of the other, to what is strange in relation to the discourse and logic of the rational community. Exposing to and engaging with the other is not something we do using rational intelligence based on knowledge of the other (Lingis, 1994) but is inherent in the way in which we respond (G. Biesta, 2006). An example of this learning as responding can be found in the research of Vandenabeele & Wildemeersch (2012). Their research on how farmers learn about environmental issues demonstrates a particular kind of learning that occurs in response to differences. They call this ‘learning as response’. The researchers develop this concept in contrast to two other concepts of learning: learning as acquisition (in the case of the study an acquisition of environmental knowledge as a fixed solution to a particular problem) and learning as participation (learning as related to the process of becoming a member of a certain community, adapting to the norms and speaking the ‘language’ of this community). However, as the researchers claim, in the public debate about environmental issues farmers are challenged to interact with others, with strangers with who they have ‘nothing in common’. The stranger interrupts the self-evidence of one’s identity and community and invites to respond to his/her questions. This creates a ‘troubling space’ that interrupts the common sense and creates opportunities to ‘come into presence’ (G. Biesta, 2006, p.53). In the interaction with others, people can give up the stability of their ‘joint enterprise’, let their identities be put into question, and start to work towards a new beginning (Vandenabeele & Wildemeersch, 2012, p.70) In this way, environmental learning becomes a process in which people are prepared to be surprised by the points of view of others and to face the ambivalences that result from this. The concept of learning as response helps to understand how farmers may learn, again and again, to respond ‘as singular beings’ to the ambiguities and differences they encounter in their everyday professional life (Vandenabeele & Wildemeersch, 2012, p.56).

### 3.3. Public education: installing dissensus

In educational theory a lot of references are made to the more radical political thinking of Rancière and Mouffe. The question of how to ‘handle’ conflict, particularly that emanating from within cross cultural encounters, is undeniably high on both the political and educational agendas in western liberal democratic societies. Populist expressions of anti-immigrant sentiment and racism have created an ever more urgent need to rethink the role of education in creating democratic forms of coexistence. Deliberative democracy (Habermas) seems to have a lot to offer to education in that it is based on formalized and rationally motivated communication that seeks to resolve conflict through
promoting shared understanding (see Todd & Säfström, 2008). Dialogue and deliberation, it is assumed, can lead us, optimally toward more peaceful forms of coexistence and, minimally, to a reduction of conflict and violence between cultural communities. But in the light of the severity and seriousness with which cross-cultural conflict emerges, favoring some form of dialogue and deliberation often leaves just two options: resolving the conflict or dismissing the conflict (Todd, 2010c). Rancière claims that true democracy is to be found in the moment that interrupts the existing social regime (Todd, 2010c, p.107). This is an interruption in the name of equality, creating a space of visibility for those who have previously been unheard and invisible. Equality, according to Rancière, can never be achieved without conflict and disagreement, breaking into the established set of ordered social relations.

Rancière fundamentally challenges the insistence on current procedures of deliberative democracy, participation, consensus and agreement (Simons & Masschelein, 2010b). The idea of a responsible citizen also puts the emphasis too much on a-political forms of citizenship that are mainly confined to doing ‘good deeds’ in the community, and provides too little opportunity for the development of political agency. For Rancière, democracy is about the power of those who have no power, those who have no qualification in a particular social or governmental order and those who do not share what should be shared in order to partake in a society, community or social order. When these ‘unqualified’ or ‘incompetent’ people nevertheless do intervene, they install a dissensus. Simons & Masschelein (2010b) further link this to Rancière’s idea of emancipation, an emancipation that is shaped by a search to create new forms of the common, which are not those of the state or of consensus. ‘The subjects of politics makes visible that which is not perceivable, that which, under the optics of a given perceptible field, did not possess a raison d’être, that which did not have a name’ and through this making perceivable we have ‘the ground of political action: certain subjects that do not count, create a common polemical scene where they put into contention the objective status of what is “given” and impose an examination and discussion of those things that were not “visible”, that were not accounted for’ (Rancière & Panagia, 2000, p.125). According to Rancière, true democracy occurs when we add something to the consensual order, something that puts this order in question. This involves always a kind of conflict since it puts into question the particular limits of a particular order and it articulates a ‘wrong’, an inequality or exclusion that is installed by that unequal order. Neutralization of this conflict means seeing it no longer as a manifestation of a ‘wrong’ but seeing it as a temporary lack of inclusion, a temporal condition of an individual (or group) in need of special support and hence as a target for all kind of expert programs on participation and inclusion. If current democratic institutions, as the school, are not aware of this and simply prepare individuals for the current consensus society, they can easily become a ‘perfect partner’ in this
current neutralization of conflicts (Simons & Masschelein, 2010a, p.600). Säfström (2011) elaborates on this in the Swedish context and claims that if schooling is mostly concerned with itself and the distribution of places and spaces in the social order, it risks no longer paying attention to what there is to be seen or heard which is not already part of this order. Simons and Masschelein (2010c) introduced the concept of ‘pedagogic subjectivation’, understood as an experience of potentiality, a strong experience that one ‘is able’ (to do something, to know something, to speak about something ...). Education is not aimed then at socialisation but creates a space for subjectivation. ‘[P]edagogic subjectivation includes engagement with ‘school material’ (texts, books ...) that one has at one’s disposal. Teachers can turn this material into a ‘thing-in-common’, in the face of which others are perceived as equals and an experience of ‘being able to’ can emerge. This experience, we suggest, is the experience of students’ leaving the family and entering the school: not as a selection or qualification machinery but as a ‘public space’ because one is equally exposed to a thing-in-common.’ (Simons and Masschelein 2010c, p. 601)

In a close rereading of Rancière’s book ‘The Ignorant Schoolmaster’, Cornelissen (2011) elaborates on an alternative perspective on the public role of schools. Entering the school building or any other kind of educational practice implies entering a space and time where particular roles, positions, customs and backgrounds are suspended and where all people are equally exposed to common things in view of new and free use (Simons & Masschelein, 2010c). In contrast with a ‘master explicator’, who transfers his knowledge in order to suppress the distance between his or her superior intelligence and the inferior intelligence of the students, an ignorant schoolmaster assumes equal intelligences. What the ignorant schoolmaster does is asking students to be attentive to a thing in common and to respond to this thing: what do I see? What do I think? What do I say? Something presented as a thing in common is something that the master does not possess but is something which invites to look, to think and to speak. This invitations requires a ‘suspension’: economic, social, cultural or private time is suspended, as are the tasks and roles connected to specific places (Simons & Masschelein, 2010c, p.675). Time, space and things are disconnected from their regular use and a possibility for common use is opened. Furthermore, the ignorant schoolmaster opens up the opportunity to separate what one sees, thinks and says from (its use in) the social order so that the tendency to see what we expect to see is in a certain sense paralysed (Cornelissen, 2011).

Seen in this way, the school or any other kind of educational practice can constitute a public space: it is a place/time where words are not (yet) part of a shared language, where things are not a property and to be used according to familiar guidelines, where acts and movements are not yet habits of a culture, where thinking is not yet a system of thought (Simons & Masschelein, 2010c, p.675).
Education is the offering time and space where a text, a statement, an idea etc. are ‘put on the table’, transforming them into common things that are at everyone’s disposal for free use. In other words, schools or any other form of education are not public because of how they are financed or how they are run, but due to their form; the acts of suspension and separation (from productive life) constitute a public time, space and matter. The relation of the master, the one who puts things on the table, towards the students is not directed at knowledge transmission or competence acquirement but at supporting attention and demanding speech (Cornelissen, 2011, p. 23). By demanding attention, the ignorant schoolmaster establishes a space in which people experience themselves as equal, to anyone else, in the sense of being equally exposed to and able to make sense of what has been put on the table (Simons & Masschelein, 2010c). Because the ignorant schoolmaster demands speech, one can also not speak of learners or students, but of ‘speakers’.

Also Mouffe (2005) theorizes conflict as a condition for democracy. Disagreement is essential to the well-being of democratic societies in that it makes debate about possible alternatives and forms of identification around democratic positions possible. But, as Mouffe acknowledges, pure antagonism can evolve to violence, so she highlights the ‘real question of democracy’, namely how to move toward an agonistic politics whereby opponents are recognized as legitimate adversaries, not as friends or enemies (Todd, 2010c). Educating to turn antagonism into agonism is about providing space and time to express views that create a culture of pluralism and about tying these views to larger political articulations, it is about introducing students to political aspects of existing in the plural condition of current society (Todd & Säfström, 2008). Expressions of very different values need to be examined in relation to the ongoing political context and social concerns in order to provide students with symbolic alternatives, that is new forms of political identification and new languages that legitimate others’ point of view (Todd, 2010c). A pedagogical intervention is then not about seeking to silence voices in the name of our own discomfort to deal with differences but recognizing the ‘wrong’ by opening up new contexts of continued contestation (Todd, 2010c). The point is not to win the argument or to do away with the passions of others, but to live in that fragile and unstable space of conflictual consensus (= a common symbolic space among opponents who are considered as legitimate enemies) (Mouffe, 2005, p.52). Educators then need to cultivate this conflictual consensus (Todd, 2010c). The commonality here is not founded on respect for the rational subject or on agreement with one another, but on the necessity of living with the tensions that are inherent in our pluralistic world. Educating for a democratic project, one that seeks to live meaningfully with difference, is to embrace the imperfection of democracy itself. That is, a democracy that is not a fully ordered or rule-bound practice but one that comes from the contestations that arise in divided communities and where disagreement comes from our encounter with difference.
4 - Conclusion

By way of conclusion we will now organize the different pedagogical strands based on their different conceptions of ‘something in common’, ‘the other’ and the role of education and the professional.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Something in common</th>
<th>Social and community education</th>
<th>The publicness of community</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A normative conception of what it means to be human.</td>
<td>A normative conception of what community (building) is. E.g. building a consensus through deliberative democracy</td>
<td>The necessity of living with the tensions that are inherent in our pluralistic world.</td>
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<tr>
<td>A common discourse.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The other</td>
<td>Plurality and difference are seen as a problem that needs to be overcome.</td>
<td>Plurality and difference cannot and should not be overcome.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The other is an object of my consciousness and should be inserted or excluded.</td>
<td>Dewey: creation of a Great Community which all share, in which different voices are heard and to which all contribute through mutual learning and cooperation (Dewey, quoted in Saito, 2009, p.103) but with the aim to seek a common ground and cultivate the common good.</td>
<td>Engaging with plurality (encounter with others) is the necessary condition for the ‘coming in to presence’ of the subject.</td>
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Role of Education and the professional

<p>| Education is an instrument to create particular identities, e.g. the active citizen, in order to contribute to the development of society and bring about a successful social order. | Production of democratic citizens. Two views: | Stimulating that issues call publics into being’ |
| Education offers a particular trajectory in order to become a | • Democracy is a particular, fixed order; education should insert people in this order. Educating individuals for (usefulness in) the community. • Dewey: democracy has to be constantly discovered, remade and reorganized. Educating individuals through the community. | Stimulating conflicts to be articulated rather than resolved or avoided and that they are dealt with in political terms ‘power’, ‘hegemony’, ‘conflict’) instead of in moral (‘good’ vs. ‘bad’) or rational (‘right’ vs. ‘wrong’) terms. |
| | | Opening up spaces of relationality. Latour/Marres: |
| | | • a sustained effort to public- |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Citizen. Education makes students ‘representatives of the common discourse’.</th>
<th>Building a good community through learning. Two dimensions:</th>
<th>italize issues</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Conservative: restoring a community ideal e.g. social cohesive society.</td>
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<td>• Radical: creating a better society through social and structural change.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• opening up issues for public involvement and prevent the exclusion of individuals, groups, opinions, and arguments.</td>
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<td>• sustained attentiveness in order to prevent that actors either claim the issue at stake or shirk responsibility by rejecting involvement</td>
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Arendt: double responsibility:

• A concern for the ‘coming into the world’ of individuals and hence the possibility of speech and action.
• A concern for and creation of worldly spaces in which one can meet, encounter and respond to what is different, strange and other.

Simons & Masschelein: creating a space of pedagogic subjectivation

Rancière: a public space where things are ‘put on the table’ and transformed into common things. Students are equally exposed to these and the ‘professional’ demands attention and response (speech).

Mouffe: educating to turn antagonism into agonism, opening contexts for continued contestation.
There are some similarities between the first and the second strand in that they both see citizenship as a status to achieve for which education becomes the instrument. Also, they both put forward an ‘ideal community’. In this sense, educating for the community can easily become educating for (building) a rational community in which some form of ‘essence’ of community is put forward, an essence to which citizens are supposed to identify. This is not the case with Dewey and other theories and practices in which we see a concern for ‘education through community’; a concern for a community in the making. Yet, how this community should be made is often based on another ‘ideal’ or normative view e.g. consensus building, emancipating groups through learning processes, ... The third strand differs from the first two in a significant way in that it puts engaging with conflict and diversity in the center of democracy and education. Learning then moves from an acquisition of particular knowledge, skills and competences to be able to participate in a certain community, to learning as responding to a thing in common and to difference.
5 - Bibliography


