Citizenship, community and social cohesion: A political science analysis

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DieGem working paper – 24/04/2013
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1 - Introduction

Marking the 20\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of the establishment of European Union citizenship with the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, the European Civil Society Platform proposed to make of 2013 the “Year of the Citizen” to foster greater awareness of rights and entitlements within the EU, thus contributing to develop solidarity and social cohesion, “a value which is not only in great need in the current economic and social climate, but also one upon which the European Union has been built”\textsuperscript{i}. It is obvious that the concept of citizenship has enjoyed, at least since the 1980s, renewed attention from political thinkers, philosophers and policy-makers alike, leading influential scholars like Kymlicka to call it the “‘buzz word’ among thinkers on all points of the political spectrum” (Kymlicka & Norman, 1994: 352). Today, fundamental changes and trends affecting post-industrial states (Crowley & Hickman 2008: 1228) have made the issue of citizenship even more pressing: globalization, international migration flows, multiculturalism, growing social and cultural diversity and pluralism, extensive individualism, the pressure on the welfare state and its social policies, the growing depoliticization of politics (technocratic and unaccountable rule,...) and of citizens (lesser engagement in politics,...) have led to a confusion of the rights and duties inherent to membership of a political community. In the midst of discussions on the so-called ‘failure of multiculturalism’, the rise of new conservative, nationalist, populist and/or extremist political parties have reopened the debate on who should and who should not benefit from entitlements, while governments and transnational institutions (for example the EU) are urging for ‘active citizens’ carrying responsibility in public matters.

Even though the word ‘citizen’ derives from the Latin \textit{civis} or \textit{civitas}, modern day discussions on citizenship started with the American and French Revolutions of the 18\textsuperscript{th} century. In its broadest acceptation, a citizen is defined as a member of a political community who enjoys rights and assumes duties. This broad definition can be traced back to debates between political thinkers and philosophers of the Enlightenment focusing on whether the status of ‘citizen’ was and should be different from the status of ‘subject’ under the Ancien Régime monarchies; and, if so, in what ways. The gradual emancipation of mainly Western-European populations introduced the idea that people constituted a community of political equals thus undermining the legitimacy of hereditary monarchical systems with privileged elites ruling their subjects. The modern notion of citizenship is therefore inexorably linked to the advent of the modern nation-state. While the idea of citizens’ self-rule was possible for small communities like cities, the larger nation-states had to bind their
populations together in ‘imagined communities’ (Anderson 1982) and rely on new mechanisms of institutional representation to organize the polity.

Citizenship is a concept that encompasses many different and at times conflicting definitions making it rather a contested terrain of competing discourses rather than a clear concept. This stems from the fact that citizenship is both an empirical as well as a normative concept. “It refers to a status which we might recognize as citizenship of a particular state or community and the rights and obligations which this status confers. In addition, such a description frequently also contains arguments about how citizenship should be developed, expanded or changed and, hence, normative arguments about what citizenship should be like” (Lister & Pia 2008: 1). As the concept of citizen refers to being a member of a political community who benefits from the rights and takes the duties of membership, citizenship is, at heart, related to questions of belonging, social cohesion and solidarity. As we will discuss more extensively throughout this paper, conceptualizations of citizenship all assume – whether emphatically or more hidden – the existence of some bond of commonality or solidarity between citizens.

This is a consequence of the specific post World War II creation of welfare states. Western national welfare states have been based on the idea of a demarcated territory, within the boundaries of which social cohesion and solidarity was fostered through the homogenization and centralization of culture. A common national identity or ‘imagined community’ was nurtured to form the perceived cultural basis for an increasingly formalized, state-organized collective solidarity. A growing degree of perceived commonality provided the necessary trust to underpin citizenship rights and duties based upon a universalistic concept of solidarity. However, globalization and migration flows have made most of the developed countries ethnically and culturally more diverse than ever before. Significantly, this has resulted in a greater variety in citizenship statuses, providing residents with highly different rights and duties. The challenge this evolution poses to the organization of solidarity in Western European countries and cities becomes increasingly salient as a question for policy as well as a topic for research (Kymlicka & Banting, 2006; Faist, 2009).

The purpose of this paper is not to rewrite the history of the concept of citizenship. Rather, we highlight the dialectic at work between the empirical and normative discussions on citizenship by focusing on the post-World War II period. During this period, we discern three major theoretical conceptualizations of citizenship. During a first stage, citizenship was predominantly seen as a legal status, i.e. people were mainly seen as formal members of a community that were granted political, economic and social rights based on the belonging to a common political community inhabiting a more or less bounded territory with more or less shared values, identities and ideas. Within this
paradigm, two traditions approached citizenship from a different angle. While the liberal tradition stressed the legal side of citizenship with its emphasis on political freedom and the rule of law as a necessary prerequisite to protect individual freedoms from interference by the state or other individuals; the republican tradition underscored the importance of citizens to engage in political life and participate in public deliberation and decision-making processes. Even though the first tradition seemed to propose a more passive conceptualization of citizenship, it nevertheless overlapped more than it differed from the republican tradition. These conceptualizations of citizenship-as-status were criticized from the 1970s onwards from different angles: the North-American conservative and European rightist parties focused their critique on the social rights and entitlements that legal aliens benefitted from, while feminist and later multicultural critiques focused on the rigid dichotomy between the public and private spheres of life that both the liberal and republican tradition entertained. This opened the way for new conceptualizations of citizenship and politics that we summarize as ‘differentiated citizenship’.

As migration was rapidly changing the composition of national communities, and as globalization spatially reconfigured the national state through connections with an array of (institutional) networks that cross national boundaries (supranational political and economic integration as well as regional devolution); the traditional ‘politics of redistribution’ based on principles of similarity in identity and passive solidarity had to be supplemented with a more intricate take on cultural diversity in pluralist and multicultural societies. Thus citizenship became also tied with a ‘politics of recognition’ beyond claims for classical social rights. This politics of recognition was a way to take into account new particular cultural-identity claims. However, the combination of classic redistributive policies with cultural sensitive measures of recognition led consequently to new challenges and issues. Citizenship, gradually, became less defined in terms of rights conferred by legal status but rather in terms of a social process. The shift in focus from the institution of citizenship to the citizens themselves is opening new avenues of thinking about the matter. Authors like Mouffe or Isin are redefining citizenship as a means to reinvent a political community that binds together a multiplicity of diverse citizens. This third line of inquiry and theoretical conceptualization seems to offer new insights in today’s discussions on the dilemmas of citizenship.

2 - Citizenship as status

held the idea that citizenship is mainly about equal treatment of citizens by endowing them with increasing rights. The relation between citizenship, as a bond of national political community, and social rights and solidarity is obvious. He situates these rights in “three parts, or elements, civil, political and social. The civil element is composed of the rights necessary for individual freedom—liberty of the person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice. (...) By the political element I mean the right to participate in the exercise of political power, as a member of a body invested with political authority or as an elector of the members of such a body. (...). By the social element I mean the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in society.” (Marshall & Bottomore 1992 [1950]: 8) The full enjoyment of all these rights is only possible, according to Marshall, in a liberal and democratic welfare state. Marshall came to this conclusion after examining historically the relationship between citizenship and social class. He saw the 20th century movement towards more equality as the latest phase of a historical process stretching over centuries; from the achievement of civil rights during the 17th century over the attainment of political rights during the 19th to, finally, the recognition of social rights in the 20th century.

This inclusive and universal approach to the question of citizenship was a consequence of the trauma of World War II. Many political thinkers agreed on the idea that (economic and social) inequality was one of the root causes of the emergence of extremist political ideologies, like Nazism and fascism, in Western Europe. The architecture of the post-World War II welfare state was based on the economic theories of John Maynard Keynes and the social reformism of Sir William Beveridge. In his Report of the Inter-Departmental Committee on Social Insurance and Allied Services, better known as ‘the Beveridge Report’, he identified five ‘giant evils’ that the United Kingdom was facing, i.e. squalor, ignorance, want, idleness and disease, and went on to propose a set of social welfare reforms to address these. Citizenship in this perspective thus mitigates the negative impact of capitalist markets through the redistribution of (scarce) resources on the basis of rights. As Isin and Turner point out “Marshall’s view of social rights was as much about offering the minimum of civilized existence to a depressed, urban working class as it was about giving them protection from unemployment” (2007: 7). As a result there is a permanent tension within liberal societies between the principle of equality and the de facto inequality of wealth and income that is distinctive to capitalist formation (Turner 2001). Marshall and others were therefore clearly seeing universal citizenship as a way to foster solidarity between different social classes and groups within capitalist society.
1.1. Liberal and Republican traditions of citizenship

The liberal view on citizenship refers to an institutionalization of rights “whose primary value is to maximize individual liberty” (Schuck 2002:132). Needless to say, many liberal thinkers have defined the nature of this liberty in different ways. Definitions of liberty, as Isaiah Berlin’s (1958 [1969]) famous common classification acknowledges, can range from ‘negative liberties’ that emphasize the individual’s right to pursue his own interest free of (state) compulsion to forms of ‘positive liberties’ that claim that the state should ensure entitlements (health, education,…) so that individuals can live a dignified life in society. Marshall’s model became associated with ‘passive citizenship’ as it emphasizes entitlements and benefits without stressing obligations and duties. Political economists and critical sociologists criticized Marshall’s model as a form of liberal reformism aimed at pacifying the working classes more through the promise rather than through the enactment of citizenship (Mann 1987).

The liberal tradition that Marshall spearheaded was criticized by the republican tradition. This tradition of thinking does not underestimate the importance of rights and entitlements but advocates for a more active exercise of citizenship. The citizen should not only passively accept his rights but should also actively participate in the polity by taking up responsibilities and showing public virtues. Legal status, for the republican tradition, is “necessary but not sufficient, for it requires the supplement of the ethical dimension” (Dagger 2002: 148). The ethos Peter Dagger is referring to is civic virtue; i.e. the necessity for citizens to take up public responsibility and engagement in public policy. The public nature of citizenship, according to Dagger, manifests itself in two ways. “The first is that the good citizen is a public-spirited person who places the interests of the community ahead of personal interests. (...) The second way in which this commitment to the public good manifests itself is in civic involvement. Good citizens will undertake public responsibilities when, called upon” (Dagger 2002: 150). This does not mean that a citizen should forsake any personal self-interest but rather that he should follow, to paraphrase De Tocqueville, a doctrine of ‘self-interest properly understood’ (Dagger 2002: 151). The republican tradition holds the idea that solidarity can only thrive when all citizens participate equally and invest themselves accordingly in the public realm.
1.2. Three critiques: (New) Republicanism, New Right and Feminism

As long as economic growth was steady (the 1950s and 1960s), welfare state policies seemed particularly successful in securing social cohesion. Only from the 1970s onwards, when the economic crisis (oil crisis, ...) took hold of most of Western European and North-American states, the consensus on citizenship gradually faded away, synchronically with landslide changes in the economic structure of most developed and industrialized countries. The shift from social Keynesianism to liberal and neoliberal models of economic structure (much more pronounced in the United States and, with Prime Minister Thatcher’s rule in the United Kingdom) also involved a great shift in the logic and rational of welfare policies. The idea that protecting individuals and families from the negative effects of the markets – that was dominant in the first decades after World War II – was gradually being replaced by policies that aim to help people “to participate successfully in the market through education (life-long learning schemes), flexible employment (family-friendly employment strategies) and tax incentives” (Turner 2001: 194). This, in turn, had a big impact on class structures Iv. While the rates of economic activity have grown since the 1970s, the radical changes in the labor market (job sharing, part-time employment, flexibility, new management strategies, ...) have, as Turner further describes, disrupted work as a career, compromised job security, triggered a decline in union affiliations and eroded the commitment of workers to the companies they work for. So, even when levels of unemployment have been falling in the 1980s and 1990s, a new class structure is emerging in which an “‘underclass’ of permanently unemployable (typically lone-parent welfare claimants), a declining middle class associated with the decline of middle management, and the ‘working poor’ whose skill levels do not permit upward mobility” (Turner 2001: 195) stand central. Furthermore, in many European countries this underclass became more and more an ‘ethnic’ underclass as a result of migration patterns.

Three different critiques emerged during these landslide economic changes. A first critique came from within the republican tradition lamenting the gradual erosion of citizenship’. A second critique came from conservative and New Right thinkers in the context of North-America targeting mainly social rights and entitlements. A third critique – to a certain extent more fundamental than the first two – came from feminism. While coming from different political and philosophical traditions, these critiques shared the concern that the extension of citizenship rights had not fundamentally altered inequality and had not integrated certain groups (such as African Americans, women, disabled
persons...) as expected. The idea that citizenship status should lead to civic integration, was off course based on the liberal idea that participation leads to social cohesion.

The complaint of republican thinkers was not so much that civic life had disappeared but rather that it had not attained the promise of real republican citizenship. As early as the 1950s Hannah Arendt (1958), for example, had warned for the gradual depoliticization of citizens. She was very apprehensive of the fact that, while economic growth, technological development and workers’ rights had opened up the possibility for citizens to have more time to engage in public debate – they massively turned away from public life (and as such from political life), preferring instead the search for consumption based hedonism. Since then, many republican inspired thinkers have criticized the erosion of citizenship, blaming either liberalism or the tendency to reduce politics to a market place. The idea that liberalism with its strong emphasis on the individual’s liberty, has worked to loosen civic bonds or in the words of the later work of sociologist Putnam (1993, 2000), has led to a decline in civic engagement, is a recurrent critique since the 1960s. In their influential work *Making Democracy Work* (1993), Putnam and his colleagues Leonardi and Nanetti discovered a correlation between civic life and the performance of political institutions. Civic communities, defined as communities characterized by civic engagement, political equality, solidarity and trust as well as a strong associational life, are the bedrock of good functioning democracies.

The powerful critique of the New Right in North America was based on the idea that granting social rights and entitlements was actually inconsistent with the (negative) freedom of others. Reminiscent of Friedrich Von Hayek’s belief that any form of taxation was a “one way road to serfdom” (2004), and Milton Friedmans’s conviction that states should choose between socialism or freedom; this line of thinking asserts that social benefits actually promote passivity and dependency of the poor. For the New Right, citizenship needed to steer away from passive entitlements and instead focus on the moral obligations of citizens to earn a living. “Since the welfare state discourages people from becoming self-reliant, the safety net should be cut back and any remaining welfare benefits should have obligations tied to them. This is the idea behind one of the principal reforms of the welfare system in the 1980s: ‘workfare’ programs, which require welfare recipients to work for their benefits, to reinforce the idea that citizens should be self-supporting” (Kymlicka & Norman 1994: 356).

This idea did not remain unchallenged. Critics of the New Right dismissed many of its assumptions and choose instead to rethink the idea of social rights. Especially in the European context – with a more established tradition of welfare policies – the idea that social rights should meet the basic needs of citizens so that they can become full members and participants within society was still
upheld. In the context of rapid migration from the 1960s onwards, many European states included non-nationals in their welfare programs creating a growing number of non-national legal residents or denizens (Benhabib 2004). While citizenship had mainly referred until then to “a legal and social status which combines some form of collectively shared identity with the entitlement to social and economic benefits and the privileges of political membership through the exercise of democratic rights... today... a significant number of denizens, asylum-seekers and/or immigrants are increasingly protected by international human rights documents”. (Benhabib 2007: 19). Even though the link between nationality and certain political privileges still exists, changes are visible throughout many European countries where third nationals can either vote or get elected in local and/or national elections.

A third line of critique that emerged throughout the 1970s came from feminism. Feminism criticized both the liberal and republican views on citizenship because, as Okin (1992) argued, they both share the assumption of a rigid division between the public and private spheres. The republican tradition conceptualizes the political as a public sphere where citizens deliberate with one another over what is just and unjust, discuss the common good and decide on public matters. Feminists argue that this strict separation is the consequence of earlier political decisions that have thwarted women’s emancipation and have subverted women’s rights. The liberal tradition, conversely, sees the private sphere as the space of personal and family life that needs protection from outside (especially the state’s) interference. The private sphere needs to be protected so that it can function as a space where individual and particular interests can be pursued. Feminist criticize this Lockean tradition of egalitarian individualism as the strict division between the public and private spheres has functioned as a way to mitigate women’s rights and prevented women from gaining access to the public.

The feminist critique was not only geared towards the acknowledgment that women should have full access to the public sphere and that citizenship should be more inclusive. The critique went further as it introduced the idea that inequalities within the private sphere have a wider significance and are utterly linked to processes of deliberation in the public sphere. Hence the idea that the private is political. What feminists wanted to show was not so much that the public and private are necessarily indivisible but rather that the boundaries between the two are socially constructed and reflect power inequalities and thus can be challenged through contestation and action.

The idea that the political cannot be isolated from the personal and the acceptance that ‘the citizen’ is, in the end, an actor in a context of class, gender, race, religion and language differences has debunked the myth of a straightforward universal model of citizenship and has inspired new conceptualizations that are much more based on a differentialist approach.
2 - Differentiated Citizenship

Since the modern-day debates on citizenship in the 19th century, the creation of legal, political and social rights defining citizenship was closely associated with the emergence of national frameworks of membership within nation-states. The production of such a national framework called for the creation of national identities that sought to fabricate domestic coherence. “The national mythologies of a society cement individual biographies and collective biographies of generations with the history of a nation-state and its people” (Turner 2001: 197). Citizenship functioned, through the work of national identity formation, as a lever for integration. However, since the 1970s as a consequence of new patterns of migration, the 1973 oil-crisis triggering economic crisis, the post May 1968 discussions, the development of communication technologies, the acceptance of the de facto diversity and pluralism of society (not only cultural or ethnic but also ecological and life-style diversity were becoming accepted) as well as the growing protection of individuals by international law; the relation between citizenship and nationality became jeopardized.

2.1. National/Post-National citizenship

Historically, there is a logical but not necessary link between the nation-state, democracy and the institutions of citizenship (Schnapper 2002: 3). Even though citizenship can be enjoyed on infra- or supra-national basis, one should take into account this historical link, as Schnapper asserts, “because the principle of citizenship can only become meaningful and organize historical societies in concrete terms, if it is part of the political institutions and social practices of a society” (2002: 3). Citizenship indeed only functions if a public sphere is constructed that transcends the divisions within society. The strong identities that nation-states created in the nineteenth century served the purpose of creating strong ties between its own citizens and foreigners. Therefore Brubacker (1992) defines citizenship in the first place as a mechanism of social closure that distinguishes citizens from foreigners as the internal inclusiveness of citizenship is related to its external exclusivity. Within the nation-state the everyday social reality is not always in tune with the legal, civil and political rights of equality that are valued by the rulers and the ruled. The tension between the abstract and universal principles of equality and justice and the reality of inequality in wealth and social position within more or less homogenous nation-states was a matter social emancipation and mobilizations. This is why political institutions are important to issues of citizenship."
However, the impact of globalization, the growing flows of migration, human rights legislation as well as the creation of supra-national political bodies (e.g. the European Union) have impacted on the historical link between nation-state and citizenship and opened up new debates (Ferrera 2005).

2.2. Liberal Nationalism

Liberal nationalists hold the idea that, even though the nation-state has lost some of its power under globalization, they still maintain that it remains the best framework to create some sense of commonality between citizens that are more and more strangers to one another. Liberal nationalists like David Miller acknowledge the negative effects of too stringent definitions of national identity (that can easily become exclusionary) but assert that nationhood can be defined in a ‘thin’ way so that it can accommodate minorities and immigrant groups, while simultaneously generating enough sentiments of solidarity and trust. Miller (1997) states that national myths serve two important purposes. Firstly, they provide the national community with a feeling of reassurance that it is grounded in history thus creating a sense of solidarity between generations. Secondly, such myths perform a moralizing role by inculcating a sense of obligation that is based on virtues ascribed to the ancestors. What is important to Miller is not so much the accuracy of the myths but rather the ways in which they are created and reproduced. As long as national identity arises from an open process of deliberation on which citizens can freely participate – as opposed to authoritatively imposed identities by indoctrination and repression – national myths can serve as mechanisms of inclusion, societal integration and create solidarity. Miller defends a principle of nationality that is contrasted with conservative nationalism but also radical multiculturalism. “Conservative nationalists treat national identities as rigid and authoritative, and therefore resist the changes in identity that immigration, for example, requires. Radical multiculturalists support the political expression of group identity, but fail to see how a secure sense of national identity can benefit minority groups. It is a defensible aim of public policy to integrate groups into such an identity, in particular, through the education system. Cultural minorities can legitimately demand equal treatment, but special rights for such groups are in general unjustified” (Miller 1997 online). What liberal nationalists are thus striving for is the downplaying of commonalities based on tradition, descent, religion or language and instead emphasize political and legal principles.
2.3. Communitarianism and Multiculturalism

The idea of community within sociological theory is historically linked to conservative functionalism, as some sort of antidote to the vicissitudes of modern life within society. Ferdinand Tönnies seminal study on *Gemeinshaft und Gesellschaft*, published in 1887, opposed the traditional, organic and cohesive community against the fragmented society associated with industrialization, individualization and rationalization. Communities, according to Tönnies, were culturally integrated wholes that supplied the individual with moral resources based on direct ties and feelings of proximity whereas society was the realm of the fragmented and distant city-life associated with economic modernity. Later sociologists, political thinkers and philosophers have sustained – albeit in different ways and interpretations – “a conception of community as embodied in a shared sense of place and cultural order based on consensus, primordialism and harmony. It led to a vision of society and of citizenship requiring the stable resources of community” (Delanty 2002: 162). Weber exemplifies, according to Isin, a “Pauline ideal of the origins of citizenship” as “political membership as oath-bound fraternity, partly because it represents commensalism (consent) but also because it embodies associational character beyond and outside kinship (choice). For Weber consent and fraternity rather than blood and kinship are the founding elements of community and hence citizenship” (Isin, 2012: 454).

Throughout the 1980s, an influential trend within social sciences and Anglo-Saxon (political) philosophy, communitarianism, became a challenger to liberal accounts on citizenship and (social) justice. Communitarians, as the name suggests, stress the importance of community life and thus reject two basic tenets of liberalism: individualism and contractualism. Reacting to John Rawl’s theory of justice, grounded on the idea of ‘the veil of ignorance’ that is too abstract a vantage point concerning the formation of political community, communitarians advocate for the grounding of citizenship in a more cultural idea of community (or communities) – in contradistinction of a political community based on some sort of liberal-consensual legal and formal contract between citizen and state – based on group affiliation. Communitarians seek to define citizenship as participation within a political community that is also about the preservation of (group) identity, a collectivism that is not solely material (like in social-democratic accounts on citizenship) but also cultural. As such it constitutes a critique on the moral universalism of liberalism as formulated by John Rawls and consorts and a defense of cultural particularism (Delanty 2002). Charles Taylor, who has become one of the leading philosophers of communitarianism, argues for a “right to recognition”. Recognition,
according to him, is “not just a courtesy we owe people. It is a vital human need” (Taylor 1994: 26). Without recognition one does not feel the need to engage in dialogical interaction with “the other”, that forms the basis of society as a whole (referring to the Gadamerian idea of “the Fusion of Horizons”). Taylor advocates for a politics of recognition that can take two forms. The first form emphasizes equal dignity for all citizens in terms of moral worth, rights and entitlements, while the second form emphasizes (political) difference in which the uniqueness of each individual or group is recognizedvii. This refers mostly to the need of majority cultures to take into account the claims and demands of minorities but refers also, as importantly, to the State’s official recognition of cultural communities. Taylor mitigated the obvious tension between the principle of (liberal) equality and the principle of communitarian difference by stating – much like Will Kymlicka’s conceptualization of multicultural citizenship (see further) – that communitarianism is not about opposing liberalism but rather making it responsive to the reality of cultural diversity within society.

The right to difference and the claim that liberal democracies should accommodate cultural pluralism stands central in the work of Will Kymlicka and his idea of multicultural citizenship. Kymlicka advocates for specific rights for groups not as a critique on liberalism’s universalism but rather as an addition: “a multicultural state will include both universal rights, assigned to individuals regardless of group membership, and certain group-differentiated rights or ‘special status’ for minority cultures” (Kymlicka 1995: 6)viii. As modern societies are increasingly faced with demands of (cultural) recognition of minority groups, Kymlicka wants to construct a model of the liberal state that is adaptive to difference and identities. However, not all minority groups can claim rights or recognition. Kymlicka only speaks about national minorities or previously self-governing, territorially concentrated cultures that have been incorporated into a larger state (Kymlicka 1995: 6) and so-called ethnic groups which he defines as loose associations of immigrants claiming rights that would achieve greater integration into the host society (Kymlicka 1995: 6-7). Kymlicka further asserts that there are three types of demands that can be formulated: (a) special representation rights for disadvantaged groups, (2) multicultural rightsix (specifically related to issues of immigration of religious groups) and (3) self-governing rights for national minorities. Kymlicka argues that the first two types of right-claims pose no problem as they are actually measures designed to either alleviated (historical) problems of underrepresentation or facilitate the inclusion of groups into society. Kymlicka has more problems with the third type of demands as these might endanger civic integration and lead to a gradual disintegration of states thus undermining a sense of solidarity and common good.
Kymlicka defends the idea of a ‘differentiated citizenship’: “In a society which recognizes group-differentiated rights, the members of certain groups are incorporated into the political community, not only as individuals, but also through the group, and their rights depend, in part, on their group membership” (Kymlicka 1995: 174). He is, of course aware, that for classic liberal thinkers the idea of a society organized on the basis of rights deriving from group membership is opposed to the very essence of citizenship as a way to treat all individuals as equals under the law. The fear of the critics of differentiated citizenship is that a group-based society has no means to bind the different groups together and instead of fostering community and solidarity, a group-bases citizenship would be a force of disunity and a means to foster distrust and suspicion. Or as Carens (2000: 193) puts it, the problem with the advocates of differentiated identity is that “the emphasis they place on the recognition and institutionalization of difference could undermine the conditions that make a sense of common identification and thus mutuality possible”. Kymlicka defends his argument by trying to show that the rise of group-based does not necessarily erode the sense of shared civic purpose and solidarity.

2.4. Habermas’ Constitutional Patriotism

For many political thinkers the history of the nation-state shows a legacy of oppression of minority cultures within its borders and, a heritage of colonialism and imperialism abroad. Habermas argues therefore that a dissociation between nation-state and the democratic politics of citizenship should be undertaken for moral and pragmatic reasons. Habermas argues for a post-national form of citizenship that transcends the classic forms of citizenship based on nationality. He introduces the concept of ‘patriotic constitutionalism’ which no longer refers to the nation as a specific, emotion-laden, totality but rather to abstract principles and processes. National identity can and should be dissociated from its national, historical, ethnic and cultural elements to establish civic participation solely on the basis on reason and human rights. Each political community defines the rule of law and human rights in specific ways, these meanings become embodied in its political and legal institutions and create a specific political culture that crystallizes around its constitution. Patriotism in this context does not refer to a historically embedded nation-state but to the universalistic principle of legally constituted states in which the constitution stands central’.

According to Habermas this constitutional patriotism does not imply the imposition of a majority culture on minorities. For him, the deliberative process of constitution-making, does not necessitate an a priori cultural homogeneity as the process of public discussion and deliberation itself can create shared understandings and forms of solidarity. “Inclusion means that a collective political existence
keeps itself open for the inclusion of citizens of every background, without enclosing these others into the uniformity of a homogenous community. A previous background consensus, constructed on the basis of cultural homogeneity and understood as a necessary catalyzing condition for democracy, becomes superfluous to the extent that public, discursively structured processes of opinion- and will-formation make a reasonable political understanding possible, even among strangers” (Habermas 2001: 73). As citizenship is delinked from particular cultural premises, it can be responsive to the changing composition of the citizenry and generate a common political culture (Leydet 2011). However, for that type of post-national citizenship to function, appropriate levels of solidarity are crucial. Citizenship should not only be associated with civic and political rights but also with the fulfillment of social, economic and cultural rights. “Taking the long view”, Habermas writes, “the only kind of democratic process that will count as legitimate, and that will be able to provide its citizens with solidarity, will be one that succeeds in an appropriate allocation and a fair distribution of rights. But to remain a source of solidarity, the status of citizenship has to maintain a use-value: it has to pay to be a citizen, in the currency of social, ecological, and cultural rights as well” (Habermas 2001: 77).

2.5. Recognition

A more radical formulation of differentiated citizenship comes from leftist and Marxist traditions of political thought. Struggles for recognition or the fight for (personal) ‘cultural identity’ can be traced back to the 1960s and the rise of the New Left, ascending in the context of May ‘68, and even goes back to cultural demands for recognition arising from the civil rights movement in the ‘50’s: from the struggle for women’s suffrage to the fight for abortion rights. The same dynamic is true of the struggle for Black liberation in the civil rights movement that finally struck down Southern segregation in the 1950s and 1960s in the US”. Notwithstanding the presence of ‘universal and constitutional rights’, many minority culture in reality never received equal treatment nor were they part and parcel of the political community ‘in practice’. Hence their political struggle that was based on being ‘different’ and the right to be given the same social and political rights in practice.

A powerful critique on universal citizenship that went much further then Kymlicka can be found in the work of Iris Marion Young. Today, she states “when citizenship rights have been formally extended to all groups in liberal capitalist societies, some groups still find themselves treated as second-class citizens. Social movements of oppressed and excluded groups have recently asked why extension of equal citizenship rights has not led to social justice and equality” (Young 1998: 250). Her claim for differentiated citizenship is based on the more critical idea that society is composed of
different social groups that are either dominant or oppressed. Therefore, equal treatment in the form of universal citizenship is but a form of disguised particularism of the dominant. Young’s analysis asserts that universal citizenship has in fact enforced a homogeneity of citizens based on the dominant’s view and has tended to exclude many groups. “(T)he inclusion and participation of everyone in public discussion and decision making requires mechanisms for group representation”, she argues and “where differences in capacities, culture, values, and behavioral styles exist among groups, but some of these groups are privileged, strict adherence to a principle of equal treatment tends to perpetuate oppression or disadvantage. The inclusion and participation of everyone in social and political institutions therefore sometimes requires the articulation of special rights that attend to group differences in order to undermine oppression and disadvantage” (Young 1989: 251). The problem with Young’s critique is that it starts from a very broad and vague definition of oppression that can include anything from economic exploitation to specific forms of cultural discrimination. Therefore she identifies many groups as being oppressed (in the US): “women, blacks, Native Americans, Chicanos, Puerto Ricans and other Spanish-speaking Americans, Asian Americans, gay men, lesbians, working-class people, poor people, old people, and mentally and physically disabled people” (Young 1989: 261). Young’s idea of a heterogeneous public sphere in which citizens attempt to engage in a dialogue across differences starting from their different positions within society sounds emancipatory and inclusive but critics have asked how such a model could “either motivate or enable citizens to engage in such a dialogue” (Leydet 2011) while others have stated that oppression is “too vague and simplistic to account for the asymmetries of power and resources in complex societies”xii (Joppke 2002: 247).

Over the last decade and as a result of societal changes already pointed at above, discussions on citizenship definitely discarded the idea to look at citizenship from a static framework of entitlements and duties, instead focusing on citizenship as a more active process (Turner 1997, 2001). Turner (2001), for example, argues that, historically, citizenship has been closely associated with three routes of effective entitlement, i.e. the involvement of individuals in the labor market, the service to the state through warfare and through the formation of households and families. These classic routes to effective social citizenship are gradually stripped of their efficiency because of demographic (the aging of the population), economic (the shift from Keynesianism to liberal and neoliberal models of economic organization) and political (globalization) trends and as such are “being slowly replaced or, better still, augmented by human rights”xiii (Turner 2001: 203)xiv.

The discussion within political theory on the redistribution/recognition conundrum has proved a fertile ground to rethink citizenship more along agonistic (Mouffe) and genealogical (Isin) ways.
Before we proceed to outline these conceptualizations, it is worth recalling – albeit succinctly – some of the main arguments presented by one of the discussions’ protagonists. Nancy Fraser’s main concern is to overcome the opposing logics of the redistribution-recognition dilemma (1995), in order to connect issues of citizenship, cultural recognition and solidarity. Fraser, heuristically and analytically, opposes a politics of redistribution that aims at redressing forms of injustice that are a consequence of political-economic structures (1995: 70) and a politics of recognition that aim to mitigate symbolic and cultural forms of injustice rooted in patterns of representation and interpretation (1995: 71)\(^{xv}\). While the former claims, in general, seem to question and destabilize group affiliations and hierarchies, the latter, on the contrary, seems to stress the distinctiveness of groups\(^{xvi}\). According to Fraser there are two distinct ways to remedy injustice. The first is affirmation, i.e. “remedies aimed at correcting inequitable outcomes of social arrangements without disturbing the underlying framework that generates them”, while the second, transformation stands for “remedies aimed at correcting inequitable outcomes precisely by restructuring the underlying generative framework” (1995: 82). Starting from these distinctions Fraser then constructs a four-celled matrix (1995: 87) with a horizontal axis representing the remedies to injustice of affirmation and transformation and a vertical axis representing the aspects of justice (recognition and redistribution). discussed. Four different political orientations thus emerge. A first one, “where redistribution and affirmation intersect, is the project of the liberal welfare state; centered on surface reallocations of distributive shares among existing groups, it tends to support group differentiation; it can also generate backlash misrecognition. In the second cell, where redistribution and transformation intersect, is the project of socialism; aimed at deep restructuring of the relations of production, it tends to blur group differentiation; it can also help redress some forms of misrecognition. In the third cell, where recognition and affirmation intersect, is the project of mainstream multiculturalism; focused on surface reallocations of respect among existing groups, it tends to support group differentiation. In the fourth cell, where recognition and transformation intersect, is the project of deconstruction; aimed at deep restructuring of the relations of recognition, it tends to destabilize group differentiations” (Fraser 1995: 86-87). From this she concludes that the most promising avenue to transcend the redistribution-recognition dilemma is a “socialism in the economy plus deconstruction in the culture” (1995: 91)\(^{xvii}\). As Fraser’s work became increasingly associated with the ongoing debate on identity politics, she re-evaluated her earlier work. The move from redistribution claims to recognition claims that became so visible in the 1990s, has led to two distinct problems. First, a problem of displacement, i.e. a problem in which “questions of recognition are serving less to supplement, complicate and enrich redistributive struggles than to marginalize, eclipse and displace them” (Fraser 2000: 108). Second, a problem of reification that refers to claims of recognition that “often serve not to promote respectful interaction within increasingly multicultural
contexts, but to drastically simplify and reify group identities. They tend, rather, to encourage separatism, intolerance and chauvinism, patriarchalism and authoritarianism” (Fraser 2000: 108). Even though Fraser agrees that both problems are serious because they can promote economic inequality or even go against basic human rights, she nevertheless still builds a case for a necessary identity politics that avoids the two pitfalls. She wants to reconceptualize recognition so that it can be related to struggles for redistribution while accommodating the complexity of identities (2000: 109). However, she seems reluctant to advocate particular remedies, maintaining that responses to injustice should be dictated by the local context.

2.6. The progresses dilemma

A number of authors (Kymlicka & Banting, 2006; Banting, 2005; Koopmans, 2010; Van Oorschot, 2010; Pearce, 2004; Goodhart, 2004) have focused on the specific tensions and challenges that arise from simultaneously implementing multicultural policies based on recognition and welfare policies based on redistribution, tensions that they conceptualize as a ‘progressives’ dilemma. Banting (2010: 797) summarizes well the question at hand: “One of the most compelling challenges facing Western democracies is how to maintain and strengthen the bonds of community in ethnically diverse societies. How can we reconcile growing levels of multicultural diversity and the sense of a common identity which sustains the norms of mutual support, the capacity to pursue collective projects and social solidarity?” Researchers advocating multicultural policies and researchers advocating redistributive mechanisms both focus on three interrelated issues: (1) attitudinal changes towards migrants and solidarity systems on the one hand, (2) on the institutional flexibility of the welfare state seeking ways to adapt to changing environments in the last decades, and (3) on the integration ‘success’ of minorities in countries where there has been a weak or strong multicultural “recognition” policy.

Different explanations are provided to explain the loss of mutual support, trust or solidarity under conditions of growing diversity. From evolutionary biology that focuses on the limits of altruism towards genetically different others, over social psychology theories focusing on the role of group identities and the limits of in- and out-group solidarity, and sociological accounts (Putnam) stating that relations of trust become more difficult as racial diversity increases, to theories rooted in rational choice emphasizing the reciprocal nature of altruism. Against this loss of social cohesion, these theories are seeking some sort of ‘cultural glue’ or ‘social cement’ to create new senses of community that could transcend ethnic, religious and/or cultural differences.
A group of researchers (Miller, 1995, 2000; Barry, 2001; Rorty, 2001) holds the idea that a politics of recognition undermines the support for a welfare policies. Based on case specific research and statistical analysis, these authors claim that the negative views vis-à-vis migrants and the general feeling of a ‘failure of multiculturalism’ has led to the undermining of the shared feelings of political community. This ultimately leads to the undermining of solidarity systems and can give way to forms of ‘welfare chauvinism’. Other authors also claim that multicultural policies are not only detrimental for solidarity but for the immigrants themselves (Koopman, 2010; Van Oorschot, 2010) as policies of recognition combined with redistributive mechanisms seem to hamper the social mobility of cultural minorities.

Migrants tend to go to countries with strong social security systems because this lowers their poverty risks and enlarges levels of security when integration fails. But, the stronger the welfare state mechanisms, the lower the push factors for migrants to integrate through the labor market. Also, compared to their former situation of deprivation, living on social benefits for some is still better than going back to their previous situation. When this interacts with multicultural policies that do not favor integration and social-ethnic mixing or assimilation through labor integration or language acquisition, the consequences is that migrants remain low on the social ladder with low social mobility, lack language and cultural ‘soft’ skills and have no networks that can function as social leverage for emancipation.

Koopman (2010), for example, has done extensive research on the tradeoffs between equality and difference in a cross-national perspective. His hypothesis is that in the Netherlands and other European countries, multiculturalism as the management of immigration-induced cultural heterogeneity, has actually increased social segregation, slowed the process of language acquisition of the migrants, weakened the educational attainments of the second generation and has limited economic integration. When multicultural policies are combined with a generous welfare state, the result is high levels of welfare dependency that never get resolved into people climbing up the social ladder with negative social mobility as an effect. By doing comparative research on integration policies and welfare-state regimes in Germany, France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Sweden, Austria and Belgium, he thus seems to support the claims against multicultural policies. Koopman’s findings “suggest that multicultural policies which grant immigrants easy access to equal rights and do not provide strong incentives for host-country language acquisition and interethnic contacts when combined with a generous welfare state, have produced low levels of labour market participation, high levels of segregation and a strong overrepresentation of
immigrants among those convicted for criminal behaviour.” (Koopman, 2010, abstract). Countries with stricter integration policies focused on assimilation such as Germany, Austria, Switzerland and France or countries with relatively less welfare mechanisms such as the United Kingdom have actually achieved better integration results.

Other authors (Tully, 2000; Parekh, 2004; Zurn, 2004) argue, conversely, that there is a zero-sum relation between cultural recognition and socio-economic redistribution, or even that multiculturalism policies can actually strengthen socio-economic status by reducing prejudice and mistrust, and thereby help build more stable pan-ethnic coalitions for social justice. Canada is frequently cited as an example that has subverted the ‘progressives dilemma’. According to Banting, Canada has found ways to sidestep the progressives dilemma by diverting adjustment pressures from the welfare state, and absorbing them in other parts of their policy regime and displacing some pressures to migrants themselves. There seems to be no evidence of negative attitudes to share with ‘strangers’ or people turning away from redistribution because of the presence of migrants. Banting suggests that we should focus on policies of diversion away from the welfare state alone, to see how policy makers try to fix the tensions that arise from a migratory enlargement. Statistics show a loss of interpersonal trust in diverse neighborhoods but no signs of a loss of faith in interpersonal mechanisms of solidarity. Support for redistribution is resistant to the effects of local diversity in Canada. The Canadian story seems to be complex as people apparently become more skeptical towards certain aspects of the welfare state, while maintaining faith in sectors of welfare intervention. “Trust in government is positively associated with support for health care and pensions and, unlike interpersonal trust, trust in government is not lower in ethnically diverse neighbourhoods” (Soroka, in: Banting 2010).

The Canadian case gives partial evidence to the thesis of ‘liberal nationalists’ who claim that a stronger sense of identity and shared community (‘being Canadian’) dilutes pressures on welfare systems and solidarity with ‘others’. According to Banting, Canada has quite a restrictive immigration policy that has mainly attracted economic stronger migrants who are capable of moving quickly into employment and self-sufficiency. Also, family reunification is tied to strong contracts with the state to support the family by providing financial support. This strictly termed admission policy has been compensated by a quite strong multicultural recognition policy, that counters critical opinions on the undermining of welfare state policies and redistribution because of incorporating cultural minority rules and policies. In practice multicultural recognition in Canada has been strongly integrationist, aiming for strong inclusion and participation. Kymlicka, as one of the strong defenders of this policy, states that the core goals of federal multiculturalism that were laid out in 1971 were based on the
principles of recognition and accommodation of cultural diversity and multi-ethnic organizations, removing barriers to participation, promoting interchange between groups and going against cultural enclavization, and promoting acquisition of the official languages. There seems to be no evidence at all for the progressive’s dilemma because there are no explicit numbers for that ‘trade off’ (Banting & Kymlicka, 2004). If there was evidence for a dwindling support for welfare mechanisms, this was rather the consequence of growing scarcity, economic crisis and budget cuts. “The restructuring of the welfare state in the 1990s was counterproductive for a diverse society. Although restructuring was not driven by the politics of diversity, there is potential fallout. (...) Since the mid-1990s, however, program cuts and changes in the labor market have reduced the proportion of the unemployed actually receiving unemployment benefits from approximately 80 per cent to 40 per cent” (Banting, 2010).

3. The comeback of ‘the political’: citizenship as social practice

3.1. Agonistic citizenship and the redefinition of politics

Critiquing multicultural and liberal theories of citizenship, Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau state that citizenship is a set of hegemonic practices or ‘social antagonisms’ (1985). For these authors the starting point to rethink the concept of citizenship is the idea of a res publica or the formation of a political community based on citizenship as ‘agonistic practices’. This post-Marxist analysis does not start from abstract models of, or idealist assumptions about citizenship, but starts from the actually existing diversified and sometimes conflicting social practices of citizenship: ‘citizenship-as-practice’.

Building on Gramscian and critical discourse theories, Mouffe and Laclau critique liberal conceptions of communicative action such as Jurgen Habermas’ discursive model or John Rawls’ deliberative conception of justice. According to Habermas (1994) people publicly discuss matters they disagree on in rational ways in order to reach a harmonious consensus and strong cohesion, something that Mouffe and Laclau deem impossible. Not only Habermas’ model seems problematic for excluding uneven relations of power and the neglecting of agonistic social forces but also the rationalist foundations of John Rawls’ ‘overlapping consensus’ comparably builds up a theory of (minimal) reasonable consensus (based on ‘justice as fairness’ as a shared conception of the good) in order for people to be as free as possible in individual expressions and behavior (Rawls, 1993). According to Mouffe, Rawls’ deliberative democracy model is a perfect liberal utopia in which disputes over principles of justice are eradicated once and for all by a political consensus adopted by reasonable,
self-interested individuals on the basis of public deliberation. (Torfing, 1999: 254). Both these liberal approaches emphasize the functionality of citizenship as an indispensable tool for engineering social harmony through deliberative consensus-based practices. Particularity is erased by the harmonious universal ideal of reason.

Mouffe argues that citizenship is contingent and historical, a statement which opens up the possibility to rethink citizenship in a largely post-national, ‘pluralistic’ rather than a multicultural environment. Mouffe claims that the reinvention of a political community is dependent on rethinking citizenship that goes beyond the conflict between the Kantian ideal of liberalism (individuals pursuing their definition of the good) and the republican civic or communitarian traditions (the good is prior to any individual definition of it). A citizen is not, in this perspective, solely the passive bearer of rights. “It is a common political identity of persons who might be engaged in many different communities and who have differing conceptions of the good, but who accept submission to certain authoritative rules of conduct. Those rules are not instruments for achieving a common purpose - since the idea of a substantive common good has been discarded - but conditions that individuals must observe in choosing and pursuing purposes of their own.” (Mouffe, 1992: 30-31). The democratic citizen takes an active part in the interpretation and constant re-enactment of the rules of conduct and the correlative ethico-political principles which, rather than prescribing a substantive consensus, function as a sort of vanishing point around which radical plural democracy is organized.

Notwithstanding diversified and conflictive practices, Mouffe and Laclau call for building up social agonistic forces through so-called ‘chains of equivalence’; i.e. shared connections between different claims and/or diverse positions. Groups could build up adversarial power against a larger set of hegemonic discourses and practices in the dominant society. By using this entry point of a conflictive re", "publica, Mouffe and Laclau’s aim is to seek further entwinement of different political claims in the making of political communityxvi.

For Mouffe and Laclau the discursive interactions that constitute citizenship practices are never and cannot be closed off in light of a universally shared idea about society. Citizenship practices function like floating signifiers that build up a symbolic realm. Although communicative interactions may be caught within imaginary boundaries that are quasi-stable, they never reach the point of what De Saussure and Lacan call “the Real”; because of the lack in the Real this prohibits any fully constituted closure. This means society can never reach the point of fulfillment. There’s no such thing as a fully constituted harmonious society. Society is always the ‘Impossibility of Society’. This means that there’s always a lack, a Big ‘O’ or Other that prohibits society from being it’s definite self and coming
to full closure. The subject and object of politics are constituted by a fundamental “Lack” as the political philosopher Yannis Stavrakakis states. By giving space or insight into the Lack of Society, one gives rise to democratic space. Or as Zizek states about democracy (as a continuous agonistic project of citizenship): “It’s radical character implies, that we can save democracy only by taking into account its own radical impossibility” (Zizek, 1989: 6).

3.2. Citizenship as acts: a genealogical approach to making public claims.

Before we enter into the debate about ‘genealogy’ and ‘acts of citizenship’, we first treat the context that has given rise to new conceptualizations of citizenship. As we are experiencing major transformations in urbanization- and thus demographic diversity in practice-, we are forced, according to Isin and Turner (2002), to explore new paths of thinking about citizenship because of spatial and relational transformations under globalization. These changes impact on the ways citizenship is practiced. Cities function as spatial assemblages for citizenship in an information age driven by innovation and migration, a space where bits and pieces of rights are reassembled. The reassembling of citizenship rights and practices are contextually embedded, what brings us to the urgent need to focus on those specific practices themselves. Citizenship is no longer about given characteristics but about what people actually do and how their citizenship identities are formed through the things they do. As Ong states: “In the urban assemblage formed by markets, politics and security, citizenship as a fixed set of political rights and duties is destabilized, as market criteria come to modify the claims of nationality” (Ong, 2006b). By taking a genealogical position, the analyses of authors such as Engin Isin or Aihwa Ong go beyond the Weberian imagine of citizenship based on a ‘sworn fraternity’, that fails to grasp the complex and contested character of the occidental city and the diverse roles that the practice of citizenship has played. Idealized abstract conceptions fall short of contextualized ‘acts’ of citizenship.

Not only the terrains on which citizenship unfolds have changed under globalization and urbanization, but also the class structures and by that the power relations between population groups. The rise of a new class has important effects on the content and extent of citizenship. Since this new class is organized around career hierarchies and professional occupations, its loyalties largely revolve around professional associations. As well, since the cultural capital it commands is fairly nation-independent makes the new class is largely a cosmopolitan class. “What does it mean to be a professional-citizen? What are the new political obligations? What are the new territorial
struggles? What are the new moral responsibilities?”, Isin asks (1997: 130). He proposes a genealogy of citizenship that focuses on the modes through which citizenship relations are (re-)produced.
But what is a genealogical approach to citizenship? The methodological focus of a genealogical approach – building on the traditions instigated by Nietzsche and Foucault – is to deconstruct any ‘essence’ or ‘firm foundation’ of citizenship or democracy that have been made self-evident. What genealogists as Nietzsche and Foucault share is a belief that there is no absolute or eternal Truth and that knowledge is created in human society through history and passed down, improved upon, and amended from generation to generation. Truth production brings with it major investments through knowledge assembly and technologies of power to let us think and feel the normalcy of things around us. It makes us feel that ‘institutions’ as citizenship and its contents of political community, rights and obligations and solidarity mechanisms are given, necessary, natural, or neutral (Dean, 1994:20) by obliterating and obscuring the diachronic histories and complex practices that form(ed) citizenship.

The main difference with citizenship as practice is that a genealogical approach focuses more strongly on the ways in which citizenship practices are ‘acts’ that are diachronically assembled on the basis of different roles, strategies, positions and interactions that change throughout space and time. This approach brings back the focus on the agencies, their positions, forms and concrete interactions and multifold practices or strategies; and thus on the contingency in the formation of political community/communities. As such citizenship as act integrates variation (in identities, claims, positions, strategies within groups or by subjects) but it goes beyond pre-assumed culturally aligned differences and claims of recognition and claims of redistribution.

In a genealogical approach the dominant practices and discourses themselves are deconstructed so as to reconstruct another history than the one (often teleological) we already know. This opens up the space for other ways of thinking about citizenship and social relations that can form the basis for new forms of solidarity. By deconstructing citizenship definitions, authors like Isin and Ong, stage citizenship as ‘flexible’, entangled with a range of practices (roles, positions, strategies, interactions) and discourses that constitute and assemble acts of citizenship.

Acts of citizenship

Not so much attention has been given to an analysis of ‘acts’ or ‘modalities of practices’ that are fundamental for this new conceptualization of citizenship. While ‘citizenship as practice’ focuses on
the ways counter-hegemonic formations are build up, ‘citizenship as acts’ fully deconstructs any essence of citizenship or social formation. The added value is not to assume anything people share in the making of social formations and shared practices, but to look at the assemblage that entangles with(in) practices themselves. More than critical discourse theories it questions the specific ways how social subjects actually become claimants of rights, not so much by focusing on the subject formation itself, but on the ways complex acts reconstitute a subject into a claimant. If we mean to study new solidarity formations in an (global) urban environment, not assuming any essences (like identity, culture, shared norms and values, class,...) people share, we are required to analyze the only thing diverse subjects share: the acts itself and how it relationally connects people in ways that support new forms of solidarity and opens up new boundaries for citizenship.

Isin is thus recasting citizenship in ways that call into question the traditional assumptions, representations and dominant ideologies that have shaped and influenced the concept of citizenship, moving beyond dualistic positions of rights and responsibilities predicated on the static legal status of abstract individuals in nation-states. It is in the sense of enactment that citizenship is social. Isin and Nielsen state: “To investigate an act is to understand that this ‘moment’ constituted by the performance of thoughts, feelings, words, practical deeds is an actively answerable attitude that I myself assume – an emotional-volitional attitude towards a state of affairs in its entirety, in the context of actual unitary and once-occurrent life’ (2008: 37). An act therefore constitutes that moment when an actor enacts not merely the content of an act, but also its sense. By casting light on the acts that form the building blocks of citizenship, new perspectives and paths become possible to deal with citizenship in a changing world. The status and habitus of citizenship is entangled with a complex web of overflowing rights and obligations on multiple levels. In a context of superdiversity (Vertovec 2007, 2010) -a diversification of diversity that changes the culturally aligned boundaries of identity due to changes in the migration patterns worldwide-, and urbanity as a battleground for the formation of complex identities with multiple allegiances (Isin, 2002), Isin analyzes the more flexible ways in which citizens behave and act in the everyday political world. Being political as citizens is about the specific acts of making social and political claims: “the formation of new subjects, sites and scales of claim making.” (Isin & Nielsen, 2008: 17).

This has had two interconnected effects on the analysis of citizenship. First, defining citizenship as social acts through which citizens make claims and produce themselves as ‘claimants’ has heightened the role of the local (as opposed to the national) level in democracy again (Isin 2000: 6). Secondly, citizenship as acts ascribes citizenship with dynamism and contingency (Isin & Nielsen, 2008). Citizenship becomes flexible, a matter of (strategic) choice arising from different spaces and tied to
different regimes of regulation (Ong, 1999; Isin, 2005). Citizenship also comes to depend upon the performativity of the persons (and contingent ‘speech acts’) involved and the assessment of the performance by others (Lepofsky & Fraser 2003; Alejandro, 1993; Radhakrishnan, 2003) In their performances and ‘speech acts’, people do not solely demand rights or solidarity, but also demonstrate responsibility and legitimacy to an audience of judging others (Isin & Nielsen 2008).

4 - Conclusion

Throughout time, different philosophers and political theorists have examined the link between citizenship and society; in other words the relation between political community and solidarity. As the world changed through the upheavals of globalization(s), be it cultural-religious, socio-cultural changes or political-economic transformations and migration, also the ways we view the relation between citizenship and political community on the one hand and solidarity has changed. In the post-world war II consensus, citizenship was the outcome, a given of the political struggles between labor and capital. People were given social and political rights as part of a homogeneous “us”, imagined to be a shared and equal society. This changed against the background of globalization that fundamentally recalibrated the self-evident relation between the (assumed and imagined) national political community and patterns of solidarity between “us” equals that serve as universalist principles on which the national welfare state is founded.

More and more the focus has shifted towards integrating ‘difference’ and differential mostly culturalist identity claims. As such this impacted on the universality principles of solidarity mechanisms. In complex societies, as the highly globalized and urbanized societies we live in now, academics were forced to go back to the core of citizenship and solidarity: that is the emphasis on actually existing relations on which it is built and the specific acts of diverse groups in society. This theoretical shift in the analysis of political community and solidarity can be seen as a theoretical leverage to answer the challenges of solidarity and the formation of political community in times of rapid migration, where there is no longer this feeling of a self-evident “us”, equals that recognize each other as part of ‘the same’. The scarcity in shared identity also touches upon the question of what we still can and we still want to share with each other as ‘others’ Referring back to the introduction and the statement of the European Union’s Commission, this puts us to the challenge of asking ourselves what citizenship and solidarity mean in this globalized era. But more than asking ourselves this theoretical question as political philosophers and political scientists, we need new theories and schemes as leverages and starting points to take this to society itself, through action
oriented research. The newness of these practices and acts-sensitive theories is the ways in which they bring theoretical focus on what people actually “do” as they become political claimants (individually or in groups) of solidarity. For now, this empirical research that take these theories to the actually existing spaces where people meet and build up complex political communities and become claimants of solidarity lacks.xxxiii

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1 http://www.eucis-ill.eu/positions/citizenship/
2 A major critique on Marshall’s hypothesis was that he represented this three phase model of citizenship as a quasi-automatic and harmonious progression within capitalism. Even though Marshall pointed out that there were conflicts involved in the process but he did not argue that this was necessary between classes or as Bottomore puts it “the impact of citizenship on social classes, rather than the impact of social classes on the extension of citizenship, was clearly his principal concern” (Marshall & Bottomore 1992 [1950]: 55).
3 For the liberal tradition citizenship firstly means being protected by the law and can, as such, be traced back to the Roman Empire. The republican tradition that sees citizenship as a political agency can be traced back to the ideas of Aristotle and many Enlightenment thinkers such as Rousseau (civic self-rule is a crucial element of his social contract theory). (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
4 This is true for most developed countries but has been the most pronounced in countries where the liberalization of the economy has gone furthest, such as the United States.
5 We see new Republicanism not so much as a new tradition of thinking, but rather as a reappraisal and reassertion of Republican critique in the face of the landslide social and economic changes of the 1960s.
6 We will not develop the importance of the (democratic) systems of political representation that played an important role in the advancement of rights and entitlements of citizens, as this falls beyond the scope of this paper.
7 Although Taylor’s starting point is based on a discursive take on identity and dialogical interaction, and thus the social construction of identity, the formation of cultural identity and its boundaries are still rapidly taken for granted in his step towards practical politics of multiculturalism and “recognition”.
8 As pointed out before, the difficulty with discussing communitarianism in relation to citizenship comes from the fact that it was a response to John Rawls’ theory of justice. Citizenship is obviously linked to the question of justice but both do not necessarily overlap. The discussion triggered by Taylor has led to specific political theories of recognition that aim at reconfiguring the concept of justice in terms of due and/or withheld recognition. Advocates of multiculturalism have focused mainly on the aspect of accommodating and respecting cultural difference. For a more general discussion on theories of recognition that stretch beyond multicultural politics see: Honneth (1995), Fraser (2000), Fraser & Honneth (2003). We come back to these later in the paper.
9 Kymlicka also refers to ‘polyethnic rights’ for this category.
10 On a first look, one could argue that Habermas’ constitutional patriotism is not that much different from David Miller’s liberal nationalism as both stress the role of a common political culture and identity. However, when one looks at the political implications of both lines of thinking, major differences become obvious. While liberal nationalists like Miller are weary of supra-national citizenship experiments (like the EU) because they lack historical depth, Habermas is a staunch defender of the creation of European citizenship (Leydet 2011).
11 During the late 1960s, the powerful civil rights movement inspired the rise of movements for women’s and gay liberation, while the struggle for Black Power emerged from the civil rights movement itself. All of these new movements were, in turn, inspired by the armed struggle of the North Vietnamese resistance against the forces of U.S. imperialism. The Gay Liberation Front (GLF) chose its name as a formal identification with the National Liberation Front (NLF)—the Vietnamese resistance.
12 From an abstract point of view Joppke (2002) asks if a society could ever exist without any form of oppression of any kind? He goes on by stating that it is not clear what the purpose of differentiated citizenship is. If it is about participation and inclusion, then the question should be inclusion into what? Inclusion into an oppressive order? If current institutions of citizenship are seen as instruments of domination, how could a more inclusive approach transcend domination?
13 “This set of human rights has evolved for two basic reasons. The problems of the global order, such as the global spread of AIDS or the pollution of the environment, cannot be solved by the unilateral action of individual
governments, and secondly because the social risks of modern society that are created by new technologies (such as cloning or genetically modified food) do not fit easily into the existing politico-legal framework” (Turner 2001: 204).

xiv He advocates therefore to consider three types of post-national citizenship that are less based on class-based activities but rather on social and environmental movements that gave diverse social memberships such as ecological rights, aboriginal rights and cultural rights.

 xv Obviously, Fraser acknowledges the constant mutual entwinements between economic and cultural forms of injustice. She writes: “Even the most material economic institutions have a constitutive, irreducible cultural dimension; they are shot through with significations and norms. Conversely, even the most discursive cultural practices have a constitutive, irreducible political-economic dimension; they are underpinned by material supports” (Fraser 1995: 72).

xvi A crucial difference between Fraser’s analysis of recognition and Axel Honneth’s and Taylor’s theories is that a lack of recognition has, for Fraser, not so much to do with problems of self-realization but rather as an institutionalized relation of subordination.

xvii It is important to note that Fraser is only focusing on the bivalent collectivities of gender and ‘race’.

xviii Typically, multicultural policies refer to explicit policies of ethnic-cultural management (separate housing, TV broadcasting, religious rights, language and identity supportive subsidies,…).

xix Belgium is seen as a specific case because of the regionalist ‘language’ schisms and the separates policy arena’s. Not only does Belgium have a history of social and religious segmentation known as ‘pillarization’ (Huysse 1987; Lijphart 1968), but the Flemish and Walloon regions have followed different models of migration policies, with Wallonia following a more French-style approach, and Flanders more strongly influenced by the Dutch multicultural approach (Bousetta et al. 1999; Gsir et al. 2005).

xx Here Mouffe refers to the conservative philosopher Oakeshott’s conception of societas as a constitutive community of ethico-political principles or ‘res publica’ (although the difference for Mouffe is the radical interpretation of freedom and equality instead of the conservative content of Oakeshott), that goes beyond liberalism’s conception of an instrumental community defined by the rule of the law (and citizenship being one identity amongst others) and the communautarian conception of community defined by the common good (and citizenship being the overriding identity). Citizenship is a social imaginary that affects all the different subject positions of social and political agents (Mouffe, 1991: 79) and is constituted through hegemonic struggles that never reach the closure of a political community into a ‘we’.

xxi Their theoretical stance integrates elements of postmodern theory. For Mouffe and Laclau post-modernity challenges the status of the modern meta-narratives rather than undermining the validity and emancipatory value of their political and ethical values (Mouffe 1989: 34). Building on insights from critical discourse theories and Lacanian political philosophy, they show how power functions in the buildup of political community through perpetual ‘conflict’ between different (discursive) claims and claimants. Conflict doesn’t mean antagonism as Carl Schmitt states (a literal friend’-’enemy’-distinction where enemies can in the last instance be destroyed) but a more political way of adversarial and differential contestation against the hegemonic societal configuration. To be clear, Mouffe and Laclau’s theory of agonistic democracy is not about “conflict” as such, as it is often read like that, but about breaking up the hegemonic consensus, and thus laying the foundations for democracy as an open process itself. Also, although Mouffe and Laclau frame citizenship as the agonistic and conflictive ways groups constitute themselves through claim-making and disagreement about conceptions of the good, they nevertheless see the need for a shared ‘grammar of conduct’ based on ‘freedom and equality’. She refers to this undecidable game between the two logics of ‘liberal freedom’ (difference) and ‘the democratic concern for community and equality’ (equivalence), as ‘radical pluralistic democracy’.

xxii This approach goes beyond citizenship conceptualized in terms of resolute oppositions, between top down social engineering and bottom up class struggles (Turner 1993), between citizens and aliens (Arendt, 1998) or social exclusions and inclusions (Marshall, 1963; Mouffe, 1992; Brysk & Shafir, 2004).
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